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“[T]he greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an 
ungrateful and sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a 
dependent Judiciary.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Alexander Hamilton famously characterized the Judiciary as the 
“least dangerous” branch.2  It “has no influence over either the sword or 
the purse” and thus “must ultimately depend upon the aid of the 
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”3  But this 
perceived safeguard has sometimes proven to be the institution’s 
undoing.  Faced with the prospect of appearing impotent, the Supreme 
Court has, on occasion, played the role of doctrinal apologist.  The Court 
has bent seemingly immutable constitutional prerogatives to sanction 
Executive action when a contrary ruling would likely go unheeded.  
The Justices learned the limits of their power early in the Court’s 
history.  In 1832, State authorities ignored the Court’s ruling in 
Worcester v. Georgia,4 and proceeded with the forced migration of the 
Cherokee Nation to Oklahoma.5  Declining to enforce the Court’s 
judgment, President Jackson was widely, although probably erroneously, 
quoted as saying, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him 
 
 1.  JOHN MARSHALL, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 
1829-30, at 616, 619 (1830), quoted in O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 532 (1933).   
 2.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).   
 3.  Id. at 523.   
 4.  31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).   
 5.  Donald E. Laverdure, A Historical Braid of Inequality: An Indigenous Perspective of 
Brown v. Board of Education, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 285, 298-99 (2004).  Georgia’s invasion of the 
Cherokee’s land ignored Worcester’s holding that: 
The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with 
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and 
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. 
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.   
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enforce it.”6  True or not, this phrase accurately sums up the Judiciary’s 
precarious position in the constitutional order.  
Viewed contemporaneously as a great embarrassment, history 
validated Worcester.  The Cherokee’s relocation, infamously known as 
the “Trail of Tears,” came to be regarded as one of the nation’s most 
shameful chapters.7  And the Judiciary emerged without any blood, 
proverbially or literally, on its own hands.  More importantly, the 
governing precedent — the life blood of our common-law tradition — 
correctly assesses the incident for what it was: a lawless act that violated 
the Constitution and treaties of the United States.  
Unfortunately, the Court has not always adhered to these principles 
when its inability to command the “sword” threatened to reveal 
perceived chinks in its armor.  The Judiciary sports a particularly 
checkered history when called upon to judge the constitutionality of 
Executive conduct during wartime.  Faced with another forced relocation 
in Korematsu v. United States,8 the Court acquiesced, finding that naked 
exigency justified deviation from ordinarily inviolate constitutional 
principles.9  As Justice Jackson’s dissent prophetically recognized, 
giving judicial blessings to such machinations poses ramifications far 
greater than the constitutional breach itself. 
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer 
than the military emergency . . . . But once a judicial opinion 
rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, 
or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution 
sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the 
principle . . . . The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready 
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim 
of an urgent need.10 
Worchester and Korematsu stand as constitutional bookends 
exemplifying the Hobson’s choice between principled, though futile, 
resolve and judicial abdication by result-oriented doctrinal manipulation.  
As Justice Jackson’s dissent forcefully reminds us, “rationaliz[ing] the 
Constitution” can have grave consequences.  Sometimes the specters of 
 
 6.  Laverdure, supra note 5, at  298-99.   
 7.  Id. at 302-03.   
 8.  323 U.S. 214 (1944).   
 9.  Id. at 223-24 (“Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers — 
and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that 
term implies — we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order.”). 
 10.  Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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past judicial mistakes return to haunt future generations.  Today, the 
Court must confront just such a revenant. 
The al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, prompted domestic 
angst not experienced since Pearl Harbor.  In the so-called “war on 
terror”11 that followed, the military and other federal agents apprehended 
thousands of suspected “unlawful enemy combatants” in the United 
States and in nations around the world — both inside and outside 
theatres of military operations.12  The Government transported hundreds 
of these men to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base for indefinite 
detention.13  Some have been held there for more than seven years.  
Relying on questionable historical precedent,14 the Executive 
claims that the existence of an “extraordinary emergency . . . for national 
 
 11.  Unlike the specific campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the “global war on terror” is not a 
“war” in the legal sense of the term.  As Professor Jordan Paust explained,  
[T]he United States cannot be at “war” with bin Laden and al Qaeda as such.  Bin Laden 
was never the leader or member of a state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent group (as 
those entities are understood in international law) that was at war with the United States.  
Armed attacks by nonstate, nonnation, nonbelligerent, noninsurgent actors like bin 
Laden and members of al Qaeda can trigger the right of selective and proportionate self-
defense under the U.N. Charter against those directly involved in processes of armed 
attack, but even the use of military force by the United States merely against bin Laden 
and al Qaeda in foreign territory would not create a state of war between the United 
States and al Qaeda . . . .   
Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, 
the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military 
Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1340-41 (2004).   
 12.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006).  The military has also detained 
alleged enemy combatants in South Carolina.  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).  
Thousands more are detained at foreign installations, most notably Bagram Air Force Base in 
Afghanistan.  David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The 
Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125, 134 n.49 (2005) 
(citing Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Secret World of U.S. Interrogation: Long History of Tactics in 
Overseas Prisons Is Coming to Light, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at A1) (noting that as of 2005 
the U.S. military reportedly detained 9,000 prisoners worldwide).    
 13.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 568; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.  See also In re Guantanamo Detainee 
Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that in addition to those detained in the 
Afghani war zone, Guantanamo detainees include men captured in, among other places, Bosnia, 
Gambia, Thailand, and Zambia). 
 14.  The Government frequently cites the military-commission trials of Henry Wirz (the 
Confederate commandant of the Andersonville prisoner-of-war camp) and the Lincoln conspirators 
as “precedent” for the propriety of military tribunals.  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 699 n.12, (Thomas, 
J., dissenting).  Neither of these historical examples were reviewed by an Article III court.  While 
the Wirz trial may have passed constitutional muster (see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)), the 
trial of the Lincoln conspirators has been called into question by subsequent authority.  See Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).   
4
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defense purposes”15 requires that some of these men must be tried not by 
Article III courts, but rather by specially created military commissions 
charged with determining their guilt.16  Such commissions, which may 
most accurately be categorized as “Article II courts,”17 deviate widely 
from civilian courts.  Ordinarily inviolate procedural protections are 
disregarded.  Juries are denied.  The right of appellate review is 
circumscribed.  The universal common-law prohibition against the 
admission of hearsay, even multiple hearsay, and un-sworn evidence is 
not honored.18  Most critically, the structural independence enjoyed by 
Article III courts and even state jurists is wholly absent.19  Military 
commissions are inquisitorial in nature.  Military judges and even the 
commission members themselves fall within the direct chain of 
command of the President and his proxies and ultimately depend on 
favorable reviews from these superiors for promotion and career 
advancement.20   
The President premised his authority to convene these tribunals on 
the Supreme Court’s controversial World War II era decision in Ex parte 
Quirin.21  Quirin sustained military jurisdiction to try eight German 
servicemen captured on United States soil on a mission to sabotage 
defense industries.22  Quirin stands in plain tension with Ex parte 
Milligan,23 the seminal case on the use of military commissions.  
Milligan famously established the “open court” rule, which holds that 
military courts lack jurisdiction to try war-time offenders in places 
 
 15.  Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833-34 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 16.  Id. at 57,833.  That is, the individuals that the Government has chosen to actually file 
charges against.   
 17.  See David J. Bederman, Article II Courts, 44 MERCER L. REV. 825 (1993). 
 18.  Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 949a(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii), 120 Stat. 2600, 
2608-09 (2006); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 614. 
 19.  While most state judgeships are elected offices and thus are answerable to the electorate, 
state jurists, unlike military jurists, enjoy institutional independence from the coordinate branches of 
government.   
 20.  Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948i-j, 120 Stat. 2600, 2603-04 
(2006).  Military defense lawyers representing Salim Ahmed Hamdan filed motions accusing 
Brigadier General Thomas Hartmann, the White House’s chief advisor on the Guantanamo Bay 
military commissions, of exercising “unlawful command influence” over subordinate officers 
defending accused terrorists.  Carol J. Williams, Defender Says Advisor Exerts Illegal Sway: A Navy 
Lawyer for Bin Laden’s Ex-Driver Says His Superior Is Pursuing Election-Year Guilty Verdicts 
When His Job Is To Be Impartial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2008, at A15.   
 21.  317 U.S. 1 (1942).   
 22.  Id. at 28-29. 
 23.  71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 80 (1866).   
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where the civil courts are open and functioning.24  In contrast, Quirin 
radically extended military-commission jurisdiction to include certain 
offenses that violate the “law of war” — even in locales where Article 
III courts are open and available to try the alleged offenders.25   
President Bush unilaterally authorized the trial of Guantanamo 
detainees by military commissions in a 2001 executive order.26  The 
order dictated that any non-citizen whom the President had “reason to 
believe . . . is or was” a member of al Qaeda or had participated in 
terrorist activities harmful to the United States “shall, when tried, be 
tried by military commission for any and all offenses triable by military 
commission that such individual is alleged to have committed, and may 
be punished in accordance with the penalties provided under applicable 
law, including imprisonment or death.”27 
The Supreme Court struck down the President’s order in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld.28  Five Justices concluded that the order was invalid because, 
unlike in Quirin, Congress impliedly prohibited the President’s actions.  
A majority of the Court concluded that the President’s unilateral act 
violated the separation of powers.  “Located within a single branch,” 
military tribunals “carry the risk that offenses will be defined, 
prosecuted, and adjudicated by executive officials without independent 
review.”29   
Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito argued in dissent that Congress 
had, in fact, impliedly authorized such tribunals.30  Even the majority 
Justices suggested that the order’s separation of powers problems could 
be cured by congressional approval.  Justice Breyer, writing for four of 
the majority Justices, specifically asserted that “[n]othing prevents the 
president from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes 
necessary.”31  He did.  Less than four months later, Congress hurriedly 
enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”).32  The MCA 
specifically provided that “[t]he President is authorized to establish 
 
 24.  Id. at 80. 
 25.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29-30. 
 26.  Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).     
 27.  Id. at 57,834.   
 28.  548 U.S. 557 (2006).   
 29.  Id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 30.  See id. at 680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Roberts recused himself from the 
proceedings.   
 31.  Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).    
 32.  Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).  
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military commissions . . . [to] try unlawful enemy combatants . . . .”33  
Despite the Act’s swift enactment, President Bush did not initiate the 
first MCA prosecutions until the spring of 2008.  On August 5, 2008, the 
commission issued its first verdict.  The tribunal convicted Hamdan 
petitioner Salim Hamdan of material support of terrorism for his 
employment as Osama bin Laden’s driver, sentencing him to five and a 
half years in military prison.34   
In this Article, I challenge Hamdan’s apparent inference that 
congressional approval can save the MCA from the “open court” rule.  I 
argue that the separation of powers remains at the heart of the 
Guantanamo military commission’s debate irrespective of the MCA.  It 
is well settled that Congress cannot divest another branch of the power it 
is constitutionally vested.35  The power at stake in the MCA is purely 
Judicial.  The authority to try criminals and administer punishment lies 
at the core of the Judicial Article’s paramount constitutional prerogative 
“to say what the law is.”36  The Constitution entrusts that power 
exclusively to the Judiciary.  Congress cannot divest it.   
In Part I, I explore the Judiciary’s proper constitutional role in the 
separation-of-powers scheme.  I assert that the Judiciary’s paramount 
constitutional obligation to declare “what the law is” necessarily 
includes the responsibility to conduct federal criminal trials.   
In Part II, I examine the role of the Judiciary in adjudications 
conducted in so-called insular areas: territories that have not been 
admitted as States.  The Court has frequently stated that the Judiciary 
plays a diminished role in such trials.  The Insular Cases37 found that the 
Constitution permits Congress to empanel jury-less legislative courts in 
federal possessions not destined for statehood.38  But the Constitution 
 
 33.  Id. § 948b(a)-(b). 
 34.  Jerry Markon, Hamdan Guilty of Terror Support; Former Bin Laden Driver Acquitted of 
Aiding Attacks, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2008, at A01.  Hamdan was acquitted of the more serious 
charge of conspiring to commit terrorist acts.  Id.  Because he had already served sixty-one months 
awaiting trial, Hamdan should be released in January, 2009. 
 35.  See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983) 
(holding that congressional enactment affording the House of Representatives a “legislative veto” 
power was unconstitutional because such a power conflicted with “[e]xplicit and unambiguous 
provisions of the Constitution [that] prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress 
and of the Executive in the legislative process”). 
 36.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 37.  Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); 
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).   
 38.  Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601 
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limits the use of such tribunals to distant locales where it would be 
impossible or at least extremely difficult to empanel juries or create 
permanent Article III courts.  I argue that necessity alone justifies these 
extraordinary tribunals.  Accordingly, they may only be constitutionally 
convened where the location of the alleged offense bears a reasonable 
geographical nexus to the territory where the trial takes place.  If no 
geographical nexus were required to justify the use of such extraordinary 
tribunals, then Congress could easily identify Guantanamo Bay or other 
locations where no Article III courts exist as the appropriate venue for 
any extraterritorial violations of American law, thereby evading the 
separation of powers and attendant constitutional protections.39  The 
alleged offenses for which the Guantanamo detainees face trial bear no 
geographical connection with the Base whatsoever.  And from the 
standpoint of producing evidence and witnesses, the Government faces 
no greater burden transporting the defendants to an Article III court on 
the mainland than to the Base.  Therefore, I assert that only an Article III 
court may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction in these cases. 
In Part III, I address Johnson v. Eisentrager,40 which strongly 
implied that aliens detained, tried, and imprisoned outside the United 
States lack judicially enforceable rights under the Fifth Amendment.  
The President has contended that this decision obviates the application 
of the “open court” rule in the case of suspects apprehended outside the 
United States and detained and tried at Guantanamo Bay.  In its recent 
decision in Boumediene v. Bush,41 the Supreme Court found that absent 
invocation of the Suspension Clause,42 Congress could not divest 
Guantanamo Bay detainees of habeas corpus review.  The Court 
distinguished Eisentrager on the ground that the United States’ control 
over the post-World War II German prison at issue in that case “was 
neither absolute nor indefinite,” but rather “was under the jurisdiction of 
the combined Allied Forces.”43  Conversely, the United States 
“maintains de facto sovereignty over” Guantanamo “by virtue of its 
 
n.30 (1976).    
 39.  Under this logic, foreign drug traffickers captured in Mexico could be transported to 
Guantanamo Bay for trial to avoid the strictures of Article III.   
 40.  339 U.S. 763 (1950).   
 41.  128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).   
 42.  The Constitution’s Suspension Clause provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in Case of Rebellion or Invasion, the public 
Safety may require it.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.   
 43.  Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260.     
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complete jurisdiction and control over the base.”44  But the Court did not 
specify what other constitutional rights, if any, apply to aliens tried at 
Guantanamo.  It stated that the Government’s constitutional obligations 
vary from one insular area to another based on a particular territory’s 
“conditions and requirements.”45  I argue that all “fundamental” 
constitutional protections apply on the Base because, as the Court noted, 
“[i]n every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the 
constant jurisdiction of the United States.”46 
In Part IV, I examine the particular contours of the Military 
Commissions Act.  In Part V, I analyze the historical evolution of the 
military commission, from its origins on the battlefields of the Mexican 
War to the present “war on terror.”  In Part VI, I examine Milligan’s 
“open court” rule and the subsequent in-roads cut by Quirin upon that 
once bright-line rule. 
Finally, in Part VII, I attempt to reconcile the doctrinal divide 
separating Milligan and Quirin.  While I strongly question Quirin’s 
propriety, I argue that the Court need not overrule the decision to avert 
the potential constitutional crisis posed by the Military Commissions 
Act.  The tensions between Milligan and Quirin invest the Court with 
substantial latitude to cabin military jurisdiction within traditionally 
recognized constitutional bounds.  In short, the Court should limit 
Quirin to its facts.  Applying these principles, I argue that military 
jurisdiction should be limited to the prosecution of:  
(1) admitted combatants, or persons whose combatancy has been 
established by an Article III tribunal; 
(2) who are members of state-affiliated military corps; 
(3) who are prosecuted for crimes committed during the pendency 
of a congressionally declared war.   
The case for circumscription of Quirin in favor of Milligan’s 
constitutional values could hardly be stronger.  Milligan is celebrated as 
“one of the bulwarks of American liberty,”47 while Quirin strongly bears 
the indicia of undue Executive influence over the Judiciary.48   
 
 44.  Id. at 2253. 
 45.  Id. at 2255 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)).   
 46.  Id. at 2261. 
 47.  3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 149 (1926), 
quoted in Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration’s Military Tribunals in 
Historical Prospective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433, 461 (2002).   
 48.  With this premise in mind, I refer to Korematsu throughout this Article.  I do not mean to 
suggest that Quirin and Korematsu are doctrinally linked.  Rather, given the Court’s sometimes 
loose adherence to stare decisis in constitutional cases, I believe that the decisions that command 
9
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I. THE JUDICIARY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The Constitution’s principal thesis is the separation of powers.  As 
James Madison warned, the American concept of government under the 
rule of law is inherently premised on the division of authority between 
separate departments.  Just as government is necessary to govern men, 
preservation of the rule of law dictates that government power must be 
divided among separate departments to “oblige it to control itself.”49  To 
that end, each branch must “resist encroachments of the others.”50  
Lacking the “sword” and the “purse,” the Judiciary is the most 
vulnerable.51   
As Marbury v. Madison52 established, the quintessential 
constitutional function invested in the Judicial Department is the 
“province and duty . . . to say what the law is”53 in “particular cases and 
controversies.”54  This now-familiar axiom is frequently associated with 
its “public rights” aspect — defining the law for future applications.55  
But Marbury equally entails a quintessential “private rights” function — 
settling disputes and ascertaining the individual liabilities of particular 
parties.56  “The province” of the Judiciary is “to decide on the rights of 
individuals.”57  This function necessarily includes the responsibility for 
 
the strongest respect are those where the Court established a legally principled position in the face 
of threatened non-compliance — Milligan, Worcester, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
Conversely, I believe the decisions that historically appeared compelled by threats of non-
compliance — like Quirin and Korematsu — command the weakest pull.    
 49.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself.”).   
 50.  Id.     
 51.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).    
 52.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).   
 53.  Id. at 177.  
 54.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (emphasis added) (citing Marbury, 
5 U.S. at 177). 
 55.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (“[A]n act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is 
void”); see also Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1416 (1988) (arguing that “Marbury was . . . a manifestation of the public 
rights model”). 
 56.  See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L. REV. 
1915, 1919-20 (1986) (“Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the necessity for judicial protection of 
vested or legal rights.  His arguments for judicial review were premised on the Court’s duty to 
decide the rights of individuals.  Marbury thus presaged the adoption of a private rights model of 
judicial authority . . . .”). 
 57.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added).   
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conducting criminal adjudications.58  As the Court explained in Toth v. 
Quarles,59   
Article III provides for the establishment of a court system as one of 
the separate but coordinate branches of the National Government.  It is 
the primary, indeed the sole business of these courts to try cases and 
controversies between individuals and between individuals and the 
Government.  This includes trial of criminal cases.60  
Exigency cannot empower Congress or the President to reallocate 
this constitutional prerogative.  “Emergency does not create power.  
Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the 
restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved.  The Constitution 
was adopted in a period of grave emergency.”61  Nor, as the Boumediene 
Court recently recognized, may Congress and the President “contract[] 
away” the Judicial role through the simple expediency of “surrendering 
formal sovereignty” over territory “while at the same time entering into 
a lease that grants total control over the territory back to the United 
States . . .”62  Indulging in such fictions violates the separation of powers 
“leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not th[e] 
Court, say ‘what the law is.’”63   
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS APPLIES TO MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
CONVENED AT GUANTANAMO BAY 
Despite Article III’s seemingly plain import, the Court has 
sanctioned extra-Judicial criminal adjudicatory bodies.  For example, in 
Ross v. McIntyre,64 the Court long ago blessed the congressional 
establishment of consular courts to try American nationals for crimes 
committed abroad.65  Such tribunals, composed of commissions staffed 
by consulate personnel, tried both civil and criminal disputes.  While the 
 
 58.  Cf. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218-19 (“[T]he Framers crafted this charter of the judicial 
department with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not 
merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article 
III hierarchy — with an understanding, in short, that ‘a judgment conclusively resolves the case’ 
because ‘a judicial Power is one to render dispositive judgments.’”) (citation and emphasis omitted). 
 59.  United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). 
 60.  Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 61.  Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934).   
 62.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2258-59 (2008).  
 63.  Id. at 2259 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).   
 64.  140 U.S. 453 (1891).   
 65.  Id. at 465. 
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Court initially justified these tribunals on the dubious notion that “[t]he 
Constitution can have no operation in another country,”66 subsequent 
decisions premised their legitimacy on necessity.67  Congress established 
consular courts in locales where literal compliance with the Constitution 
was impossible.68  Their jurisdiction was limited to locations lacking a 
sufficient population of American citizens to constitute a jury pool, in 
lands too distant to enable transport to the United States for trial.69  The 
Constitution countenanced such tribunals to avert potential anarchy and 
vigilantism.70  Nonetheless, as Justice Black later recognized, because 
 
 66.  Id. at 464.   
 67.  See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 56 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Insofar as 
[Ross] expressed a view that the Constitution is not operative outside the United States . . . it 
expressed a notion that has long since evaporated.  Governmental action abroad is performed under 
both the authority and the restrictions of the Constitution . . . . Ross is not rooted in any abstract 
principle or comprehensive theory touching constitutional power or its restrictions.  It was decided 
with reference to a very particular, practical problem with a long history.”). 
 68.  In his concurring opinion in Reid, Justice Harlan suggested a more forgiving standard 
than objective impossibility:  
[T]he basic teaching of Ross and the Insular Cases is that there is no rigid and abstract 
rule that Congress, as a condition precedent to exercising power over Americans 
overseas, must exercise it subject to all the guarantees of the Constitution, no matter 
what the conditions and considerations are that would make adherence to a specific 
guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous. 
Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy has endorsed this standard.  United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  While the 
precise definition of “impracticable and anomalous” remains unclear, it plainly is something short 
of impossible.  In my view, the standard should be governed by “impossibility.”  “Impracticability” 
is only relevant to the degree to which the Government owes a constitutional duty to transport 
defendants, witnesses, and evidence to districts where civilian courts are open for trial.  See Reid, 
354 U.S. at 47 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting the government’s argument that “it would often 
be equally impracticable to transport all the witnesses back to the United States for trial”). 
 69.  Reid, 354 U.S. at 56-57 (plurality opinion).   
 70.  Id.; see also David A. Melson, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractors: A 
Historical Overview, 52 NAVAL L. REV. 277, 304 (2005) (“Both legislative and consular courts 
served as exceptional tribunals, hearing cases where access to U.S. courts was impossible or 
impractical.  They were created out of necessity, administering justice to a small number of 
Americans.”).  It should be noted that the historical premise underlying the conclusion that such 
tribunals were necessary to prevent lawlessness is somewhat dubious.  This assumption was 
inevitably based on the conclusion that the nations where they were established lacked sufficiently 
mature legal systems to adjudicate criminal prosecutions involving Americans.  “These courts, 
typically founded on coercive treaties, adjudicated claims among western citizens abroad as well as 
between western citizens and locals, on the theory that the local law was barbaric, unpredictable, 
and strange.  In other words, westerners in places like Shanghai lived under their home state’s laws 
(or an amalgam of western laws) rather than Chinese law . . . .”  Kal Raustiala, The Geography of 
Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2511 (2005).  The potential racism lurking behind this rationale 
was overtly expressed by Ross: “Treaties conferring . . . jurisdiction upon [consular courts] were 
essential to the peaceful residence of Christians within [non-Christian] countries and the successful 
prosecution of commerce with their people.”  Ross, 140 U.S. at 463. 
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consular courts, in effect, blended the trinity of federal authority in a 
single department, they raised grave separation-of-powers concerns:   
[C]onsuls could and did make the criminal laws, initiate charges, arrest 
alleged offenders, try them, and after conviction take away their liberty 
or their life — sometimes at the American consulate. Such a blending 
of executive, legislative, and judicial powers in one person or even in 
one branch of the Government is ordinarily regarded as the very acme 
of absolutism.71 
The Judiciary has similarly played a diminished role in territories 
that have not been admitted as States.  Beginning in American Insurance 
Co. v. Canter,72 the Court, per Chief Justice Marshall, recognized that 
Article IV73 empowers Congress to establish “legislative courts” in 
territories that have not yet become States.74  Such courts exercise 
jurisdiction outside the operation of “that judicial power which is 
defined in the 3d article of the Constitution.”75  The judges presiding 
over these tribunals lack the tenure and salary protections afforded to 
Article III judges.  Canter affirmed their constitutionality, reasoning that 
Article IV invests Congress with plenary power over federal territories 
equivalent to that enjoyed by States.  “In legislating” for territorial 
courts, “Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of 
a state government.”76  Thus, just as the States possess the plenary 
authority to establish their own court systems, Congress likewise may 
empower territorial governments to empanel their own tribunals to fill 
the role served by the state courts.77  This authority to convene 
 
 71.  Reid, 354 U.S. at 11 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).   
 72.  26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).   
 73.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
States”).  
 74.  Canter, 26 U.S. at 546.  Canter addressed the constitutionality of a judgment issued by a 
Florida territorial court.  Id.   
 75.  Id.   
 76.  Id.   
 77.  Id.  As the Court explained of Congress’s parallel plenary power over the District of 
Columbia: 
Congress may . . . exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state 
legislature . . . would have in legislating for state or local purposes.  Congress “may 
exercise within the District all legislative powers that the legislature of a State might 
exercise within the State; and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and 
among courts and magistrates, and regulate judicial proceedings before them, as it may 
think fit, so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
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legislative courts immediately divests when the territory becomes a 
State.78  While these courts are generally obligated to observe the 
strictures of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,79 they lack the 
institutional independence afforded Article III courts.   
The Supreme Court has also emphasized that Congress is not 
required to establish lifetime Article III commissions in places where the 
tenure of federal jurisdiction is uncertain.  As the Court has explained, 
the “transitory character” of territorial governments justifies the 
establishment of non-Article III courts:80 “[t]he absence from the 
Constitution of [Article III’s tenure and salary] guarantees for territorial 
judges was no doubt due to the fact that the organization of governments 
for the territories was but temporary, and would be suspended when the 
territories became states of the Union.”81  Given the uncertain nature of 
diplomatic endeavors, the same is plainly true of the establishment of 
American consuls and consular courts.    
In the Insular Cases,82 the Court found that the Judiciary’s role is 
still further weakened in so-called “unincorporated” territories.  
Distinguishing “incorporated” and “unincorporated” territories, the 
Court has explained, “[t]he former category encompassed those 
Territories destined for statehood from the time of acquisition, and the 
Constitution was applied to them with full force. The latter category 
included those Territories not possessing that anticipation of statehood.  
As to them, only ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights were guaranteed to 
the inhabitants.”83  “Fundamental” constitutional rights applicable in 
 
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973) (emphasis added) (quoting Capital Traction Co. 
v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (1899)).   
 78.  Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 243 (1850).  As the Benner Court explained: 
The admission of [a] State into the Union br[ings] the Territory under the full and 
complete operation of the Federal Constitution, and the judicial power of the Union 
could be exercised only in conformity to the provisions of that instrument.  By art. 3, § 1, 
“The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in 
such inferior courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.  The 
judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good 
behaviour.” 
Id. 
 79.  Canter, 26 U.S. at 543.   
 80.  O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 536 (1933).   
 81.  Id. at 536-37 (quoting McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 187-88 (1891)).   
 82.  Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); 
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
 83.  Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601 
n.30 (1976).   
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unincorporated territories are generally synonymous with those rights 
applicable against the States through the selective-incorporation 
doctrine.84  But the right to trial by jury is an important exception.  For 
purposes of the selective-incorporation doctrine, the right to “trial by 
jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice” 
and thus is applicable to States via the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.85  But the Court found that it was not 
“fundamental” in the context of unincorporated territories.86 
The Court’s endorsement of more relaxed constitutional restraints 
upon Government action in unincorporated territories stemmed 
principally from the presumed inability of the local populations to 
accommodate the right to trial by jury.  The Insular Cases repeatedly 
emphasized the perceived impossibility of convening juries in territories 
deemed to be lacking “citizens trained to the exercise of the 
responsibilities of jurors.”87  Boumediene recently offered a more 
sensitive explanation for this rhetoric.   
Prior to their cession to the United States, the former Spanish colonies 
operated under a civil-law system, without experience in the various 
aspects of the Anglo-American legal tradition, for instance the use of 
grand and petit juries.  At least with regard to the Philippines, a 
 
 84.  See Montalvo v. Colon, 377 F. Supp. 1332, 1340 (D.P.R. 1974).  As the Montalvo court 
explained: 
Curiously, despite the difference in outward appearance between the Fourteenth 
Amendment provision that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” and the doctrine 
announced in Downes v. Bidwell that only “fundamental” provisions of the Constitution 
apply in “unincorporated territories” like Puerto Rico, the practical and theoretical 
application of these two standards has been remarkably similar. 
Id.;  see also Kermit Roosevelt, III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2055 n.187 (2005) (“Application of the Bill of Rights to the states eventually 
came to be governed . . . by an analysis that asked whether the asserted right was ‘fundamental’. . . . 
Likewise, the Insular Cases now tend to be understood as adopting an approach that turned on the 
fundamentality of the right at issue.”).   
 85.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (emphasis added).   
 86.  Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309-13 (1922).   
 87.  Id.  The supposition of Balzac and other Insular Cases was premised largely upon 
dubious assumptions concerning the intellectual capacities of the populations of the insular 
territories and ultimately smacks of racism.  Balzac’s conclusion that Puerto Rico lacked a sufficient 
pool of qualified jurors is particularly questionable in light of the Court’s recognition that at the 
time of the decision Puerto Rico utilized jury trials in felony cases.  Id. at 300.  The Court also 
found that the Constitution’s uniform-taxation requirement is inapplicable to Puerto Rico.  Downes, 
182 U.S. at 287.   
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complete transformation of the prevailing legal culture would have 
been not only disruptive but also unnecessary, as the United States 
intended to grant independence to that Territory.88 
Ross and the Insular Cases raise the question whether the Judiciary 
plays any role in the Guantanamo Bay military trials of aliens accused of 
extra-territorial offenses.  As I will explain in greater detail in the 
following sections, the authority to convene military tribunals and 
consular courts are of a similar constitutional vintage.  When military 
authorities assume the role of providing temporary governance for 
territories where civil authority has been displaced, they necessarily 
assume the power and responsibility to provide a functioning legal 
system.  But military courts — like consular courts, legislative courts, 
and jury-less “unincorporated” territorial courts — cannot serve as 
constitutional substitutes for Article III tribunals in territories where 
such constitutionally contemplated courts are open and available to try 
offenders.  Rather than constituting alternative tribunals that may be 
empanelled at the whim of Congress or the President, or both, these 
extraordinary tribunals are permissible only in places where Article III 
courts cannot operate.89   
Ross concluded that Congress may constitutionally convene 
consular courts in Japan to adjudicate crimes committed by American 
nationals there.  But this does not imply that such tribunals can be 
constitutionally empanelled inside the United States.  Nor does Ross 
stand for the proposition that Congress can convene such tribunals on an 
island or ship just outside the territorial waters of the United States to 
evade the strictures of Article III or the Bill of Rights.90   
 
 88.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2254 (2008). 
 89.  Legislative courts established in “incorporated” territories differ from unincorporated-
territorial courts, military courts, and consular courts.  As previously noted, the power to establish 
territorial courts does not arise from any special circumstances.  Rather, as Canter explained, the 
power to establish these tribunals arises from the plenary power Congress exercises over federal 
territories — the same type of power States exercise over their own territory.  American Ins. Co. v. 
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).  As such, they are analogous to state courts.  It is well 
settled that the Constitution accords state courts dignity equal to that of Article III courts.  See 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 346 (1816) (“[S]tate judges are bound by an oath 
to support the constitution of the United States, and must be presumed to be men of learning and 
integrity”).   
 90.  While access to an Article III forum and compliance with the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights are separate issues, the Supreme Court has suggested that the two rights may be coextensive.  
Addressing the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in the civil context, the Court noted, 
[O]ur decisions point to the conclusion that . . . the question whether the Seventh 
Amendment permits Congress to assign . . . adjudication to a tribunal that does not 
16
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In my view, the military-commission precedents, the consular 
tribunals sanctioned by Ross, and the jury-less courts recognized by the 
Insular Cases should be read collectively as a constitutional backstop — 
a last resort to prevent anarchy in transitory venues.91  The principle 
underlying all these tribunals is the need to convene local courts to try 
local offenses.  The Constitution does not compel authorities in remote 
locales to transport defendants, witnesses, and evidence across distant 
seas to the United States for trial whenever a crime has been committed.  
This principle is particularly compelling in the case of military 
commissions, at least as traditionally organized.  Historically, military 
officers empanelled commissions to conduct trials in the theatre of war 
itself where the very witnesses, usually soldiers, might be called upon at 
any moment to restore the peace or repel invaders.92   
But where, as in the case of Guantanamo, the Government has 
voluntarily chosen to transport accused offenders thousands of miles 
from the war zone, the strictures of the separation of powers should 
apply in full force.  The Government could constitutionally try Ross 
before a consular court in Japan for a crime committed in Japan.  But if 
it transported him across the Pacific, it could not try him before a 
similarly constituted court on the Farallon Islands (a federal enclave 
located twenty-seven miles off the coast of San Francisco).93  Having 
assumed the burden of transporting him, and presumably the witnesses 
 
employ juries as factfinders requires the same answer as the question whether Article III 
allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III 
tribunal.   
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989). While Granfinanciera involved the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury in the trial of common-law causes of action in the civil context, these 
justifications would resonate even more strongly in the context of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 
in criminal cases.   
 91.  Boumediene’s explanation of the Insular Cases emphasized the importance of the 
transitory character of unincorporated territories: 
[A] complete transformation of the prevailing legal culture [in transitory federal 
enclaves] would have been not only disruptive but also unnecessary, as the United States 
intended to grant independence to that Territory . . . . The Court was thus reluctant to risk 
the uncertainty and instability that could result from a rule that displaced altogether the 
existing legal systems in these newly acquired Territories.   
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2254. 
 92.  Military commissions are convened “typically on the battlefield itself.”  Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 596-97 (2006) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
 93.  For purposes of this hypothetical, I treat the Farallones as an “unincorporated” territory.  
Technically the Farallones are part of the State of California, although the federal government 
exercises exclusive jurisdiction.  The islands have been designated as a marine wildlife sanctuary.   
Dave Owen, The Disappointing History of the National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 711, 725-26 (2003).   
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and evidence, such a great distance, the Government would, in effect, 
waive any claim of geographical inconvenience.  The fact that the 
hypothetical Farallones “court” would be twenty-seven miles closer to 
Japan than the federal courthouse in San Francisco would not provide 
the necessary geographical nexus.  The only purpose for convening such 
a tribunal would be to take advantage of the perceived diminished 
constitutional constraints.  The constitutional limitations implicit in the 
separation of powers cannot be so easily evaded.  The Guantanamo Bay 
commissions are no different.   
As Justice Stevens noted, the Hamdan commission “was appointed 
not by a military commander in the field of battle, but by a retired major 
general stationed away from any active hostilities.”94  The MCA did 
nothing to change this status quo.  No exigency or need to adjudicate 
locally war-time offenses requires that accused offenders apprehended in 
the Middle East be tried in the Caribbean.  As Justice Stevens further 
noted, the President’s dilatory prosecution firmly demonstrates that the 
offenses at issue, being far removed from the battlefield, are not the sort 
“which military efficiency demands be tried expeditiously . . . .”95  
Indeed, many of these men “were captured hundreds or thousands of 
miles from a battle zone in the traditional sense of that term,”96 including 
such distant locations as Bosnia, Gambia, Thailand, and Zambia.97  The 
Government plainly demonstrated its will to transport these men many 
thousands of miles.  It could easily have transported them another 125 
miles to a venue where Article III courts are open and available to try 
them.98  The authority to convene consular tribunals in distant lands does 
not empower Congress or the President to employ the same procedure 
for offenders that have actually been transported nearly within sight of 
American shores.  And so it is with military commissions.99   
 
 94.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 612.  
 95.  Id.   
 96.  In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446 (D.D.C. 2005) (“In addition 
to belligerents captured during the heat of war in Afghanistan, the U.S. authorities are also detaining 
at Guantanamo Bay . . . numerous individuals who were captured hundreds or thousands of miles 
from a battle zone in the traditional sense of that term.  For example, detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
who are presently seeking habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia include men who were taken into custody as far away from Afghanistan as Gambia, 
Zambia, Bosnia, and Thailand.”). 
 97.  Id.   
 98.  Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-Territorial Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 369, 372 (2007) (noting that the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is 125 miles from 
Miami, Florida “as the crow flies”). 
 99.  Whatever exigency the Government may normally claim regarding war-time 
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Once removed from the exigency of the war zone, the legitimacy of 
military tribunals rapidly dissipates.  The inability to comport with the 
separation of powers in the chaos of combat does not warrant the use of 
circumscribed military-commission procedures in the trial of an alleged 
war-zone offender years after the Government has transported him far 
away from the fighting.   
III. GUANTANAMO DETAINEES ARE IN PRIVITY WITH THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 
The President has repeatedly asserted that alien Guantanamo 
detainees taken into custody outside the United States possess no 
enforceable constitutional rights.  This argument finds its genesis in the 
Ross Court’s assertion that “[t]he Constitution can have no operation in 
another country.”100  While later cases rejected this ill-considered 
principle,101 vexing questions still linger about the scope of 
constitutional protections enjoyed by foreign detainees captured outside 
the United States.  It remains clear that the Constitution possesses 
limited extraterritorial application.    
 In Johnson v. Eisentrager,102 the Supreme Court held that the writ 
of habeas corpus was unavailable to foreign troops captured, tried by 
military commissions, and imprisoned outside the territorial boundaries 
of the United States.103  The petitioners were German soldiers convicted 
of war crimes by American military commissions convened in China 
during World War II.104  Following their convictions, Allied Forces 
imprisoned them in West Germany.105  Finding that the writ lacked 
 
jurisprudence, it has plainly waived any such assertions here.  As the Hamdan plurality noted:  
[T]he circumstances of [the petitioner’s] trial present no exigency requiring special speed 
or precluding careful consideration of evidence.  For roughly four years, [he] has been 
detained at a permanent United States military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  And 
regardless of the outcome of the criminal proceedings at issue, the Government claims 
authority to continue to detain him based on his status as an enemy combatant.   
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 646.  
 100.  Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).  
 101.  See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“When the 
Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and 
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just 
because he happens to be in another land.”).   
 102.  339 U.S. 763 (1950).   
 103.  Id. at 777-78. 
 104.  Id. at 765-66. 
 105.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2260 (2008) (“Unlike its present control over the 
naval station, the United States’ control over the prison in Germany was neither absolute nor 
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extraterritorial effect, the Eisentrager Court held that it could not 
consider the merits of their habeas petition: 
We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended 
to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their 
presence in the country implied protection.  No such basis can be 
invoked here, for these prisoners at no relevant time were within any 
territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of 
their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all 
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.106   
Citing this principle, the Government has repeatedly argued that 
habeas corpus and other express constitutional rights are inapplicable to 
Guantanamo detainees captured outside the United States.107  The 
Supreme Court initially rejected this argument on statutory grounds in 
Rasul v. Bush.108  Rasul addressed habeas petitions filed by Kuwaiti and 
Australian detainees accused by the Government of offering material 
support to the Taliban.109  The Government asserted that the prisoners 
could not challenge their detentions by habeas petition because, as in 
Eisentrager, they were non-citizens captured and detained outside the 
United States.  The district court accepted this argument, finding that 
“aliens detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States [may 
not] invok[e] a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”110  The Supreme 
Court rejected this conclusion on statutory grounds, finding that 
Congress, in the habeas statute,111 conferred jurisdiction to all persons, 
regardless of citizenship, “detained within ‘the territorial jurisdiction’ of 
the United States.”112  The Court found that Guantanamo fell within 
American “territorial jurisdiction” as used in the statute because “[b]y 
the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States 
exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over [the Base], and may 
continue to exercise such control permanently if it so chooses.”113   
 
indefinite.  Like all parts of occupied Germany, the prison was under the jurisdiction of the 
combined Allied Forces.”).   
 106.  Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777-78 (emphasis added).   
 107.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 626 (2006).    
 108.  542 U.S. 466 (2004).   
 109.  Id. at 472. 
 110.  Id. at 472-73.   
 111.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2004).   
 112.  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480 (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).   
 113.  Id.     
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The MCA unmistakably revoked the statutory habeas jurisdiction 
over alien Guantanamo detainees recognized by Rasul.114  Boumediene 
struck down this provision of the MCA as violative of the habeas corpus 
Suspension Clause.  The Court concluded that while it was bound to 
accept the political branches’ assertion that Cuba retains “de jure 
sovereignty” over the Base, the Constitution required acknowledgment 
of “the obvious and uncontested fact that the United States, by virtue of 
its complete jurisdiction and control over the base, maintains de facto 
sovereignty over th[e] territory.”115  Boumediene interpreted Eisentrager 
to establish not a “formalistic, sovereignty-based test,”116 but rather a 
“functional approach to questions of extraterritoriality.”117  The majority 
did not specify the contours.  Citing the Insular Cases, it simply noted 
that constitutional restrictions upon Government actions vary in 
territories that are not States based on a particular territory’s “conditions 
and requirements.”118  Applying this ambiguous standard, the Court 
found that because the United States exercised “complete jurisdiction 
and control over the base”119 and a right of perpetual occupation, the 
applicable “conditions and requirements” warranted application of the 
Suspension Clause.  The Court contrasted Guantanamo with the Allied-
occupied German prison at issue in Eisentrager:   
The Allies had not planned a long-term occupation of Germany, nor 
did they intend to displace all German institutions even during the 
period of occupation.  The Court’s holding in Eisentrager was thus 
consistent with the Insular Cases, where it had held there was no need 
to extend full constitutional protections to territories the United States 
did not intend to govern indefinitely.  Guantanamo Bay, on the other 
hand, is no transient possession.  In every practical sense Guantanamo 
is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United 
States.120   
Boumediene did not decide what other constitutional rights might 
be applicable at Guantanamo.  But the Court implied, in dicta, that 
because the United States acquired the Base at the same time as Puerto 
Rico and other insular areas and had governed it continuously since that 
 
 114.  Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).   
 115.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2253 (2008). 
 116.  Id. at 2257. 
 117.  Id. at 2258.  
 118.  Id. at 2255 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)).   
 119.  Id. at 2253. 
 120.  Id. at 2260-61 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).   
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time, it constituted an unincorporated territory.  Rejecting the 
Government’s assertion that Cuba’s claimed de jure sovereignty 
precludes jurisdiction, the Court noted:  
The necessary implication of the [Government’s] argument is that by 
surrendering formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a 
third party, while at the same time entering into a lease that grants total 
control over the territory back to the United States, it would be 
possible for the political branches to govern without legal constraint.  
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this.121 
Indulging such a fiction would contravene the separation of powers 
by giving Congress and the President “the power to switch the 
Constitution on or off at will,” enabling them “to govern without legal 
constraint.”122  Such divestment of the Judiciary “would permit a striking 
anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in 
which Congress and the President, not this Court, say ‘what the law 
is.’”123   
The fact that Guantanamo detainees have been held in territory 
“within the constant jurisdiction of the United States”124 alone brings to 
bear, at minimum, the “fundamental” constitutional rights recognized by 
the Insular Cases.  Further, the constitutional provisions most pertinent 
to the exercise of military jurisdiction — Article III’s separation of 
powers and the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial — do not 
differentiate between citizens and aliens.  Rather, they “are universal in 
their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.”125  The Insular Cases held that these provisions are 
inapplicable to trials conducted in unincorporated territories.  This rule, 
however, arises as a function of necessity, not legislative discretion.  
Crimes are ordinarily tried in the district in which they are committed.  
Hence, when crimes are committed in insular areas, the Government is 
not expected to transport offenders, witnesses, and evidence across 
distant oceans to Article III courts.  But when the Government seeks to 
try extra-territorial offenders in an insular area lacking any geographical 
nexus to the location of their alleged crimes, I posit that the otherwise 
universally applicable rights afforded by Article III and the Sixth 
 
 121.  Id. at 2258-59 (emphasis added).   
 122.  Id. at 2259. 
 123.  Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).   
 124.  Id. at 2261. 
 125.  Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (emphasis added).   
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Amendment nonetheless must apply; at least, where, as in the case of 
Guantanamo Bay, the Government would have faced no greater burden 
transporting the defendants, witnesses, and evidence to an Article III 
court than to the insular area.  My thesis rests on two indispensable 
propositions: 
(1) The United States exercises sufficient “de facto sovereignty” 
over Guantanamo Bay to dictate that accused alien offenders detained or 
tried there achieve constitutional privity acquiring at minimum the 
“fundamental” constitutional rights applicable in “unincorporated 
territories”; and 
(2) No geographical nexus exists between the Base and the alleged 
offenses at issue and the Government would have faced no significant 
additional burden in transporting the accused offenders to districts where 
Article III courts are open and functioning.  
I will address each of these issues in turn.  
 A. The United States Exercises Sufficient De Facto Sovereignty 
Over Guantanamo to Invoke “Fundamental” Rights Applicable in 
Unincorporated Territories  
The Guantanamo Bay Naval Base comprises forty-five square 
miles of land and water along the southeast coast of Cuba.126  The 
United States occupies the site pursuant to a purported “lease” 
agreement with Cuba.127  While the agreement asserts that “the United 
States recognizes the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the 
Republic of Cuba over the [leased areas],” it dictates that the United 
States shall “exercise complete jurisdiction and control over” the site and 
that it shall continue to do so into perpetuity if it wishes, “[s]o long as 
the United States . . . shall not abandon” it. 128  The Boumediene Court 
found that despite Cuba’s “de jure sovereignty” over the base, the 
United States exercised sufficient “de facto sovereignty” to invoke the 
habeas Suspension Clause there.  While the Court applied the Insular 
Cases’ “conditions and requirements”129 analysis, it did not find that the 
constitutional rights applicable at Guantanamo are necessarily 
coextensive with those applicable in Puerto Rico and other 
 
 126.  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004).    
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id.   
 129.  Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 
(1922)). 
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unincorporated territories.  “The formal legal status of a given territory 
affects, at least to some extent, the political branches’ control over that 
territory.  De jure sovereignty is a factor that bears upon which 
constitutional guarantees apply there.”130  Thus, Boumediene held open 
the possibility that Guantanamo’s unique “conditions and requirements” 
might render some constitutional rights applicable in insular areas where 
the United States exercises both “de jure” and “de facto” jurisdiction 
inapplicable at the Base.  Dissenting in Rasul, Justice Scalia argued that 
the United States’ jurisdiction over Guantanamo is more akin to the 
military occupation of a foreign battlefield than to Puerto Rico:  “Since 
‘jurisdiction and control’ obtained through a lease is no different in 
effect from ‘jurisdiction and control’ acquired by lawful force of arms, 
parts of Afghanistan and Iraq should logically be regarded as subject to 
our domestic laws.”131   
This argument fails because it ultimately places undue emphasis on 
the fictional use of the term “lease.”  A familiar axiom of property law 
holds that the use of a term of art to describe a given ownership interest 
will not convert that interest into something it is not.132  For example, a 
conveyance that endows a recipient with a mere “right of access” to a 
particular property is an “easement,” even if the instrument labels the 
interest conveyed “fee simple.”133  The bald use of the term “fee simple” 
manifestly contradicts the interest expressly conveyed by the instrument.  
The legal definition of lease is “[a] temporary conveyance of the right to 
 
 130.  Id. at 2258. 
 131.  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 501 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Writing for the D.C. Circuit in 
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), Judge Randolph accepted Justice Scalia’s 
rationale, denying habeas review to Guantanamo detainees: “The text of the [Guantanamo Bay] 
lease and decisions of circuit courts and the Supreme Court all make clear that Cuba — not the 
United States — has sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay.”  Id. at 992.  Justice Thomas also asserted 
this position in his dissent in Hamdan, arguing without substantial elaboration that 
“[n]otwithstanding the ill-considered dicta in . . . Rasul . . . , it is clear that Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
is outside the sovereign ‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States.”  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 670 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  The Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene 
rejected this view.   
 132.  See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the 
conveyance’s use of standard “fee simple” deed form was not determinative because the actual 
interest described by the instrument had the “legal effect” of “convey[ing]’ only an easement”); 
Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 545, 572 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (noting that use of the 
term “fee simple” was not determinative because the language of the conveyance actually described 
a “right of way”); Ray v. King County, 86 P.3d 183, 189-90 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that use 
of the term of art “right of way” in conveyance not determinative because the language of the 
conveyance was “most consistent with the grant of fee title, not an easement”).   
 133.  See supra note 132.       
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use and occupy real property . . . ; the lease term can be for [natural] life, 
for a fixed period, for a period terminable at will — but always for less 
time than the lessor has a right to.”134  Conversely, fee simple is “[a]n 
estate of indefinite or potentially infinite duration . . . .”135  Here, 
irrespective of the talismanic use of the term “lease” in the instrument, 
the interest conveyed is perpetual, “of potentially infinite duration.”  
Thus, the conveyance at issue is plainly not “for less time than [Cuba] 
has a right to.”  As such, the use of the term “lease” is purely fictional.  
In truth, the interest conveyed, being expressly of “indefinite” and 
“potentially infinite duration” is, in the vernacular of property law, fee 
simple.136  Thus, applying Boumediene’s “functional approach,” the 
United States in every sense exercises the same degree of sovereignty 
over the Base that it wields over Puerto Rico and other unincorporated 
territories.137  This is particularly evident in light of the facts that the 
United States’ annual $4,000 rental payment has not been accepted in 
more than forty years138 and Cuba, the de jure sovereign, has repeatedly 
demanded that the United States vacate the Base to no avail.139   
The indefinite nature of the Government’s property interest in 
Guantanamo also distinguishes it from military occupation of territory in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Occupation of the latter sort is, by definition, 
temporary and gives rise to no vested property rights.140  Moreover, in 
the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States’ presence is at least 
theoretically premised on the consent of the actual sovereigns.  
Similarly, the United States acted as a licensee or an invitee of the 
Chinese authorities when it convened the military tribunals at issue in 
 
 134.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 366 (2d pocket ed. 1996) (emphasis added).   
 135.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 649 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 
 136.  The fact that abandonment would reinstitute Cuban sovereignty simply creates a right of 
reversion.  The possibility of “reversion” in the event of abandonment does not undermine or 
diminish the possessor’s “dominion” over property.  United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 
1380, 1384 (Pa. 1983).   
 137.  See, e.g., Creppel v. Shell Oil Co., 738 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that a “fee 
simple” title constitutes “dominion”).   
 138.  Owen Fiss, The State as an Instrument of Justice: In the Shadow of War, 58 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 449, 456 (2003).   
 139.  Christopher J. Schatz & Noah A. F. Horst, Will Justice Delayed Be Justice Denied? 
Crisis Jurisprudence, the Guantanamo Detainees, and the Imperiled role of Habeas Corpus in 
Curbing Abusive Government Detention, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 539, 562 (2007). 
 140.  While a court may defer to claims of temporary military occupation made by Congress or 
the President, if at some point it became clear that the occupation was not in fact temporary, then in 
my view the occupied territory like Guantanamo would become United States territory for 
constitutional purposes.  
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Eisentrager.141  Conversely, Cuba has repeatedly demanded the United 
States vacate Guantanamo to no effect.142    
Because Boumediene seemingly reaffirmed the Insular Cases and 
extended their application to Guantanamo, litigants properly within the 
jurisdiction of the Base are entitled to neither an Article III tribunal, nor 
a jury trial.  Thus, if a hypothetical local population resided at 
Guantanamo, such a polity would be entitled only to the jury-less 
legislative courts contemplated by the Insular Cases.143  But, as I argued 
in the previous Part, the serious constitutional issues raised by such 
tribunals, require that their jurisdiction be subject to strict geographical 
limitations.   
The Executive arrested Guantanamo detainees in numerous distant 
locations, including among other places, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Gambia, 
Thailand, and Zambia.144  No geographical nexus whatsoever exists 
between crimes committed in Zambia (or Afghanistan) and a court at 
Guantanamo Bay.  While Congress can establish military tribunals in 
these locations to try crimes committed there, it cannot establish such a 
tribunal at Guantanamo.145  Having transported accused offenders within 
125 miles of open and operating Article III courts, the Government has 
waived any claim that geographical necessity excused application of the 
separation of powers and the Bill of Rights.  As Ross demonstrated, the 
Government is not obligated to transport accused offenders along with 
witnesses and evidence halfway around the world for trial before an 
Article III tribunal.  But, having gratuitously transported the 
Guantanamo detainees many thousands of miles, the Government cannot 
pretextually stop just shy of the American coastline for the express 
purpose of evading the Constitution.  This was the President’s aim.  In 
2001, then-Attorney General Ashcroft candidly admitted that the evasion 
of constitutional rights constituted one of the Government’s principal 
 
 141.  Similarly, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), United States 
authorities did not exercise sovereign authority in conducting a search of a Mexican national’s 
Mexican property; rather they acted as invitees of Mexican authorities.  Id. at 262.   
 142.  Schatz & Horst, supra note 139, at 562. 
 143.  “[O]ther than the detainees themselves, the only long-term residents are American 
military personnel, their families, and a small number of workers.”  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 
2229, 2261 (2008). 
 144.  In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446 (D.D.C. 2005).   
 145.  I do not assert that the Government necessarily need establish a separate tribunal in each 
such country.  But in my view, to act constitutionally the Government must establish at least 
regional tribunals bearing some reasonable geographical nexus to the location of the accused’s 
arrest, alleged offense, witnesses, and evidence.   
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motives for utilizing military commissions rather than Article III courts.  
“Foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the United States . . . 
are not entitled to and do not deserve the protections of the American 
Constitution.”146   
 B. The Constitutional Protections of Article III and the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments Apply to Citizens and Non-Citizens Alike 
The Eisentrager Court concluded that the “Fifth Amendment’s 
protections do not extend to aliens outside the [United States’] territorial 
boundaries.”147  Boumediene qualified this pronouncement finding that 
aliens detained at Guantanamo acquired sufficient constitutional privity 
to implicate the Suspension Clause.  But the question remains whether 
an alien arrested outside the United States enjoys the protections of 
Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments when brought forcibly to 
the United States to face justice.  The plain constitutional text answers 
this question.   
Article III prescribes a generally applicable institutional structure.  
Similarly, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments speak globally of “persons” 
and “accused[s]”; they contain no qualifiers limiting their protections to 
citizens.148  As the Supreme Court said of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Wong Wing v. United States,149  
The . . . Amendment . . . is not confined to the protection of citizens.  It 
says: “Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”  These provisions are 
universal in their application to all persons within the territorial 
 
 146.  Robin Washington, War on Terrorism; Lawyers Raise Red Flags Over Military 
Tribunals, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 15, 2001, at 006, quoted in Belknap, supra note 47, at 434.  This 
proffered rationale stands at odds with constitutional precepts.  Even at the high-water mark of its 
deference to the Executive, the Supreme Court recognized that “[c]onstitutional safeguards for the 
protection of all who are charged with offenses are not to be disregarded in order to inflict merited 
punishment on some who are guilty.”  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).  The fallacy of the 
Attorney General’s rationale is self-evident: the Government asserts the defendants’ presumed guilt 
itself demands that they must be deprived of the Constitution’s procedural safeguards governing the 
determination of guilt.   
 147.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763, 784 (1950)). 
 148.  U.S. CONST. art. III; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 149.  163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
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jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or 
nationality . . . .150 
This same rule of interpretation applies with equal force to the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments:   
Applying this reasoning to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must be 
concluded that all persons within the territory of the United States are 
entitled to the protection guaranteed by those amendments, and that 
even aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.151 
Thus, “‘[a]ll persons within the [incorporated] territory of the United 
States,’ including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the Federal 
Government . . . .”152 
Despite the broad import of these decisions, not all constitutional 
protections — even some regarded as “fundamental” — are bestowed 
upon aliens.  In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,153 the Court, per 
Chief-Justice Rehnquist, held that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions 
did not protect an alien in custody in the United States from a 
warrantless search of his Mexican home.154  The Court concluded that 
while “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come 
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial 
connections with the country,” the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
an alien from extraterritorial searches and seizures if she “has had no 
previous significant voluntary connection with the United States . . . .”155  
The Court concluded that the defendant’s involuntary extradition to the 
United States did not constitute the requisite “voluntary connection” to 
subject the search of his Mexican home to the strictures of the Fourth 
Amendment:  “[T]his sort of presence — lawful but involuntary,” the 
 
 150.  Id. at 238 (emphasis added). 
 151.  Id. (emphasis added).   
 152.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982).  The Plyler Court did not refer to the Insular 
Cases’ distinction between “incorporated” and “unincorporated” territories, but given Boumediene’s 
apparent reaffirmation of the doctrine, the above-quoted statement must be taken as applying only to 
“incorporated” territories.  See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1990) 
(citing the Insular Cases approvingly). 
 153.  494 U.S. 259 (1990).   
 154.  Id. at 278. 
 155.  Id. at 271.   
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss1/2
07-DEVEAUX-2 1/27/2009  1:04 PM 
2009] RATIONALIZING THE CONSTITUTION 41 
 
Court concluded, “is not of the sort to indicate any substantial 
connection with our country.”156   
A broad reading of Verdugo-Urquidez suggests that an alien 
defendant forcibly brought into the United States to face charges is 
vested with no constitutional rights whatsoever.  But a closer analysis 
reveals that the privity requirement contemplated by the Court is 
inapplicable to the institutional framework and procedural protections of 
Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments for two reasons.157   
First, the Court limited the articulated rule to constitutional 
violations committed by American authorities outside of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.  The Court found that because the 
defendant was brought into the United States involuntarily, he lacked the 
requisite connection with the U.S. to challenge the propriety of the 
search of his property in Mexico.158  The Court did not suggest that he 
lacked sufficient constitutional privity to be afforded the procedural 
rights guaranteed by Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments at 
his trial in the United States.159  Rather, the Court emphasized the 
constitutional significance of the location of the alleged breach by 
contrasting it with the Constitution’s criminal-procedure protections: 
“The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants.”160  As 
such, “a constitutional violation” of that right “occurs only at trial” in the 
United States.161  The Fourth Amendment “prohibits ‘unreasonable 
searches and seizures’” and as such “a violation of the Amendment is 
‘fully accomplished’ at the time of an unreasonable governmental 
intrusion,” which occurred in Mexico.162  Thus, “if there were a 
constitutional violation” of the defendant’s rights “it occurred solely in 
Mexico.”163  Only because the constitutionally questionable conduct took 
place outside the United States did it become necessary to examine the 
nature of the defendant’s contacts with the U.S. in order to ascertain 
whether his extraterritorial property interests were protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.  Conversely, a Fifth Amendment violation “occurs 
 
 156.  Id.     
 157.  The Court expressly noted that the applicability of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were 
not at issue in the case.  Id. at 264.  Thus, any suggested broader application is purely dicta.   
 158.  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). 
 159.  Id. at 264. 
 160.  Id.   
 161.  Id.     
 162.  Id.     
 163.  Id. (emphasis added).   
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only at trial” in the United States and thus presumptively protects the 
defendant, regardless of his nationality and “connections” with the 
U.S.164    
Second, the Chief Justice’s decision expressly distinguished the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions from the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.  In Rehnquist’s view, by using the term “the people” to 
describe the intended beneficiaries of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Framers directed its protections to a particular constituency.165  “‘[T]he 
people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the 
Constitution.”166  The term, the Court explained, “refers to a class of 
persons who are part of the national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part 
of that community.”167  Because the Fourth Amendment’s use of the 
term “people” indicates that its protections are limited to this special 
polity, the Court engaged in its protracted “contacts” analysis to 
determine whether the defendant constituted one of the “people.”168  
Illustrating the significance of the use of the Amendment’s reference to 
“the people,” the Chief Justice emphasized that this term “contrasts with 
the words ‘person’ and ‘accused’ used in the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments regulating procedure in criminal cases.”169   
Verdugo-Urquidez implies that an alien must demonstrate some 
special nexus with the United States to apply constitutional provisions 
textually applicable to “the people” (the First, Second, and Fourth 
Amendments) to government conduct outside the United States.  
Conversely, provisions applicable to “persons” or “the accused” or that 
contain no limiting language at all apply to “all persons within the 
territory of the United States.”170  The protections of Article III and the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments plainly fall within this latter category.   
 
 164.  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). 
 165.  The Fourth Amendment provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 166.  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.   
 167.  Id.  The Chief Justice buttressed this interpretation by noting that “[t]he Preamble 
declares that the Constitution is ordained and established by ‘the People of the United States.’”  Id. 
(emphasis added).   
 168.  Id. at 265-66.   
 169.  Id.    
 170.  Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (emphasis added).   
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The Insular Cases dictate that neither citizens nor aliens enjoy 
Article III’s separation of powers or the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial 
right within the proper jurisdiction of an unincorporated territory.  But 
this is only the case where the unincorporated territory is the 
geographically appropriate venue for trial.  When the Government brings 
an alien to de facto United States territory such as Guantanamo Bay for 
trial or detention, at minimum the so-called “fundamental” constitutional 
protections recognized by the Insular Cases attach.  If that forum is a 
State, then the full panoply of constitutional protections171 are applicable 
to the trial of the accused unless he falls within the very narrow category 
of military jurisdiction addressed in Part VII-B, infra.  If the forum is an 
“unincorporated” territory, then a second question comes into play: Does 
the offense charged bear a proper geographical nexus to this 
unincorporated territory?  If the answer is “yes,” as explained in the 
preceding Part, then the accused may be tried there by a non-Article III 
court subject only to the “fundamental” constitutional protections 
applicable to unincorporated territories.  But if the offense charged bears 
no geographical nexus to the forum and if the Government could just as 
easily have transported the accused offender to a district where an 
Article III court is open and available, the protections of the separation 
of powers and the Sixth Amendment must apply.  The truncated 
constitutional protections applicable in unincorporated territories and 
consular courts are permissible only in exceptional circumstances.  The 
Government cannot deliberately transport offenders to such locales when 
Article III courts are equally accessible, even if they are captured outside 
the United States, to evade inconvenient constitutional protections.  This 
is exactly what the MCA does.   
IV. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT 
Accepting Hamdan’s invitation to “return[] to Congress to seek the 
authority he believe[d] necessary,”172 the President lobbied Congress in 
the summer of 2006 for explicit authorization to convene military 
commissions.  In response, Congress hastily enacted the MCA.  As 
requested, the statute places the power to militarily try individuals 
apprehended in the “war on terror” squarely in the Executive’s hands.   
 
 171.  With the probable exception of alleged violations premised upon constitutional 
provisions textually directed toward “the people,” where the violation alleged occurred outside the 
United States.   
 172.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).   
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The Act authorizes the President “to establish military 
commissions”173  to “try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in 
hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and 
other offenses triable by military commissions.”174  Such tribunals 
purportedly possess exclusive jurisdiction to try “any offense made 
punishable by [the statute], or the law of war, when committed by an 
alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on or after September 11, 
2001.”175  The Act expressly provides that such tribunals “shall not have 
jurisdiction over lawful enemy combatants.”176     
The MCA broadly defines “unlawful enemy combatants” to 
include, among other things, any “person who has engaged in hostilities 
or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the 
United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy 
combatant . . . including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or 
associated forces . . . .”177  Conversely, “lawful enemy combatant” status 
is narrowly limited to state-affiliated actors.  The definition includes 
only, 
(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in 
hostilities against the United States; 
(B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance 
movement belonging to a State party engaged in such hostilities, 
which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the 
law of war; or 
(C) a member of a regular armed force who professes allegiance to a 
government engaged in hostilities, but not recognized by the United 
States.178   
Thus, unlike traditional military-commission jurisdiction, which 
historically focused upon crimes committed by members of state-
affiliated foreign military units, the MCA limits military jurisdiction 
exclusively to sub-state actors.179   
 
 173.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948b(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2602 
(2006).   
 174.  Id. § 948b(a).   
 175.  Id. § 948d(a).   
 176.  Id. § 948d(b) (emphasis added).   
 177.  Id. § 948a(1).   
 178.  Id. § 948a(2) (emphasis added).   
 179.  See infra Part V.B.2.   
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The statute specifically invests the Secretary of Defense with 
significant authority over the conduct of military commissions.  The Act 
empowers the Secretary to “convene[] commissions”180; to select 
commission members that he deems “are best qualified for the duty”181; 
and to “prescribe regulations providing for the manner in which military 
judges are . . . detailed to military commissions.”182  Perhaps most 
critically, the statute entrusts the Secretary, “in consultation with the 
Attorney General,” to prescribe “[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial 
procedures, including elements and modes of proof . . . .”183  This power 
includes an express authorization to promulgate rules of evidence 
permitting the admission of hearsay evidence so long as “the proponent 
of the evidence makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in 
advance to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to meet the 
evidence” unless the adverse party “demonstrates that the evidence is 
unreliable or lacking in probative value.”184     
Finally, the statute authorizes commissions to impose the full 
panoply of criminal punishments, including life imprisonment and the 
death penalty.185   
V. THE GENESIS OF MILITARY-COMMISSION JURISDICTION 
As Hamdan explained, the Constitution makes no mention of 
military commissions; nor were they initially created by statute.  Rather, 
the institution “was born of military necessity.”186  It was “inaugurated” 
by General Winfield Scott during the Mexican War in 1847.187  “As 
commander of occupied Mexican territory, and having available to him 
no other tribunal,” General Scott established military courts to try both 
“ordinary crimes committed in the occupied territory” and “offenses 
against the law of war.”188   
In dicta, the Supreme Court denounced General Scott’s invocation 
of military courts as a violation of the separation of powers in 1851:   
 
 180.  Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948(h), 120 Stat. 2600, 2603 (2006).   
 181.  Id. § 948i(b).   
 182.  Id. § 948j(a).   
 183.  Id. § 949a(a).   
 184.  Id. § 949a(b)(2)(E)(i) & (ii). 
 185.  Id. § 950i.   
 186.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006).    
 187.  Id.  
 188.  Id. (emphasis added).  
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[U]nder the Constitution . . . the judicial power of the general 
government is vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts 
as Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish.  Every court 
of the United States, therefore, must derive its jurisdiction and judicial 
authority from the Constitution or laws of the United States.  And 
neither the President nor any military officer can establish a court in a 
conquered country, and authorize it to . . . administer the laws of 
nations.189   
Despite this condemnation, President Lincoln renewed the practice 
when the Union Army was called upon to govern occupied Confederate 
territory during the Civil War.  This time the Court gave its blessing.  
Writing for the majority in The Grapeshot,190 Chief Justice Chase opined 
that  
it became the duty of the National government, whenever the insurgent 
power was overthrown, and the territory which had been dominated by 
it was occupied by the National forces, to provide as far as possible, so 
long as the war continued, for the security of persons and property, and 
for the administration of justice.191   
Citing Colonel William Winthrop’s 1920 treatise Military Law and 
Precedents,192 the so-called “Blackstone of Military Law,”193 the 
Hamdan plurality stated that the Constitution sanctions the use of 
military commissions in three situations.194  “First, [military 
commissions] have substituted for civilian courts at times and in places 
where martial law has been declared” and the civilian courts have been 
legitimately closed.195  “Second, commissions have been established to 
try civilians as part of a temporary military government over occupied 
enemy territory or territory regained from an enemy where civilian 
government cannot and does not function.”196  I will refer to these two 
types of tribunals collectively as territory-based commissions.  Third, the 
Government may constitutionally convene commissions “as an incident 
 
 189.  Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 515 (1852) (emphasis added).  It should 
be noted that Jecker did not address the question whether military courts may be empanelled with 
congressional authorization.  See id. 
 190.  76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129 (1869).   
 191.  Id. at 132.   
 192.  WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1920).   
 193.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 597 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957)).   
 194.  Id. at 595-96.  The dissenters accepted this characterization.  Id. at 683 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).    
 195.  Id. at 595; see also id. at 683 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 196.  Id. at 595-96 (internal quotation omitted); see also id. at 683 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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to the conduct of war when there is a need to seize and subject to 
disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or 
impede our military effort have violated the law of war.”197  The Court 
coined this species of tribunal as the “law of war” commission.198   
A “law of war” commission is “utterly different” from territory-
based commissions and its jurisdiction is more limited.199  “Not only is 
its jurisdiction limited to offenses cognizable during wartime, but its role 
is primarily a factfinding one — to determine, typically on the battlefield 
itself, whether the defendant has violated the law of war.”200  With the 
exception of the Quirin and Yamashita201 decisions addressed below, 
every military commission sanctioned by the Supreme Court fell into the 
territory-based categories identified in Hamdan.  The Executive 
convened each such tribunal in the theatre of war — on the battlefield 
itself, in occupied territory, or in locations where martial law was 
legitimately declared and the civilian courts could not operate.  In these 
environments, the realities of war sometimes require the adoption of 
truncated procedures.  Empanelling commissions constitutes an expense 
of limited military resources.  The judges and commission members are 
officers whose principal duty is to ensure the national defense.202  The 
investigators are usually soldiers whose primary function is not police 
work.203  Consequently, they are not usually trained in the proper 
 
 197.  Id. at 596 (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at  683 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
Citing Colonel Winthrop, Hamdan noted at least four additional jurisdictional limitations 
traditionally placed upon military commissions: 
First, “[a] military commission, (except where otherwise authorized by statute), can 
legally assume jurisdiction only of offenses committed within the field of the command 
of the convening commander.”  The “field of command” in these circumstances means 
the “theatre of war.” Second, the offense charged “must have been committed within the 
period of the war.”  No jurisdiction exists to try offenses “committed either before or 
after the war.”  Third, a military commission not established pursuant to martial law or 
an occupation may try only “[i]ndividuals of the enemy’s army who have been guilty of 
illegitimate warfare or other offences in violation of the laws of war . . . .”  Finally, a 
law-of-war commission has jurisdiction to try only two kinds of offense: “Violations of 
the laws and usages of war cognizable by military tribunals only,” and “[b]reaches of 
military orders or regulations for which offenders are not legally triable by court-martial 
under the Articles of war.”   
Id. at 597 (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 192, at 836-39) (citations omitted); see also id. at 683 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 198.  Id. at 597; see also id. at 683 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 199.  Id. at 596-97 (2006) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 683-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 200.  Id. at 596-97 (emphasis added).   
 201.  In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).  Yamashita is discussed in detail in infra Part VI.C.1.   
 202.  WINTHROP, supra note 192, at 836. 
 203.  Gen. Thomas L. Hemingway, Wartime Detention of Enemy Combatants: What if There 
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collection and handling of evidence.204  Even the witnesses are 
frequently military personnel who might be called to fight at any time.205  
Thus, tradeoffs of normally inviolate civil liberties are tolerated.   
The prophylactic procedural protections applied in civil courts are 
time consuming and often impossible to accommodate: 
It . . . take[s] time to secure a grand jury indictment, to allow the 
accused to procure and confer with counsel, to permit the preparation 
of a defense, to form a petit jury, to respect the elementary rules of 
procedure and evidence and to judge guilt or innocence according to 
accepted rules of law.206   
Thus, juries are denied.  The rules of evidence are substantially 
relaxed.207  Military tribunals routinely permit the “admission in 
evidence of depositions, affidavits and hearsay and opinion 
evidence . . . .”208  Appeals are often denied or their scrutiny is 
substantially diminished.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that 
Article III review of the verdicts of military commissions (usually 
habeas review209) is limited to “the lawful power of the commission to 
try the [accused] for the offense charged.”210  Where military tribunals 
possess proper subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties, “correction of 
 
Were a War and No One Could Be Detained Without an Attorney?, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
63, 85 (2006) (opining that “America’s war-fighting ability will be markedly and adversely affected 
if the duties of our soldiers as warriors are forced to compete with the obligation to act as 
investigators”).   
 204.  See id. at 84 (“Capturing an enemy on the battlefield and disarming him is a routine 
combat activity. Once an enemy is detained and removed from the area of active hostilities, the 
soldier who captured the enemy remains on the front lines — fighting.”).   
 205.  See Tim Bakken, The Prosecution of War Crimes: Military Commissions and the 
Procedural and Substantive Protections Beyond International Law, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 553, 
559 (2007) (arguing that trying enemy combatants in U.S. courts would inhibit military capacity by 
requiring “field commanders” to return to the U.S. to testify thereby “divert[ing] [their] efforts and 
attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home”).   
 206.  Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 331 (1946).   
 207.  It has sometimes been suggested that deviations from the standard rules of evidence are 
justified because, as is in bench trials, the fact-finders in military tribunals are not lay jurors.  In my 
view, this justification is dubious in light of the fact that military-commission members historically 
consisted of officers and enlisted men with no legal training whatsoever.  See Carol Chomsky, The 
United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13, 19 (1990).  
As such, they would presumably be subject to the same influences as lay jurors.   
 208.  In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 6 (1946); Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 
§ 949a(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii), 120 Stat. 2600, 2608-09 (2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 614 
(2006). 
 209.  See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 253 (1864) (holding that judgments of 
military commissions are not appealable to the Supreme Court on direct review).   
 210.  Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8.   
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[such tribunals’] errors of decision is not for the [Article III] courts but 
for the military authorities which are alone authorized to review their 
decisions.”211   
Most importantly, while commissions employ the usual platitudes 
concerning the presumption of innocence, the basic machinery of justice 
is tilted in a manner to secure more convictions than in civilian courts.212  
Blackstone’s axiom that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape, than 
that one innocent suffer,”213 is not honored in theatres of war.  It cannot 
be.  “Civil liberties and military expediency are often irreconcilable.”214  
War zones are violent places where people die.  Minimizing 
casualties — both among civilians and servicemen — requires more 
exacting discipline than is tolerated in civil society.215   
Relaxations of normally inviolate civil protections have been 
constitutionally tolerated so long as they are limited to war zones.  The 
very attempt to convene quasi-judicial institutions in such environments 
constitutes a laudable attempt to honor the basic concepts of justice.  In 
earlier times, occupying military governments simply ignored crimes 
against civilians, and those suspected of crimes against the military were 
summarily executed.216  Faced with the choice of permitting complete 
 
 211.  Id.   
 212.  Military-commission trials conducted in the aftermath of the Great Sioux Uprising 
illustrate the disturbing conviction rate of military tribunals.  As Professor Carol Chomsky 
succinctly chronicled:  
Between September 28 and November 3, 1862, in southwestern Minnesota, nearly four 
hundred Dakota men were tried for murder, rape, and robbery.  All but seventy were 
convicted, and 303 of these were condemned to die.  After an official review of the trials 
[by the President], the sentences of thirty-eight were confirmed and, on December 26, 
1862, these thirty-eight were hanged in Mankato, Minnesota, in the largest mass 
execution in American history.   
Chomsky, supra note 207, at 13.  Similarly, the Quirin Court noted nineteen military trials of 
alleged British spies conducted during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.  Ex parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 42 n.14 (1942).  These tribunals are not considered to be of the same pedigree as 
military commissions.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590 (tracing the first incidents of true military 
commissions to the Mexican War in 1847).  But these trials further demonstrate the brutal certainty 
of military justice.  Of the nineteen men tried, the military tribunals convicted eighteen.  Quirin, 317 
U.S. at 42 n.14.  The military hanged sixteen of these men, one escaped before he could be 
executed, and one death sentence was commuted by President Madison.  Id.  The conviction rate 
evidenced in these historical examples (18-1) is one that any career prosecutor would surely envy.   
 213.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.   
 214.  Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 331 (1946). 
 215.  “[The] exigencies of military discipline require the existence of a special system of 
military courts in which not all of the specific procedural protections deemed essential in Art. III 
trials need apply.”  O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969). 
 216.  See Steven R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 35 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 939, 993-94 (2003).  Cf., Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 301 (1865) 
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lawlessness and bringing perpetrators to justice through the use of an 
expedited process, the use of military commissions constitutes a 
necessary lesser evil, both to protect civilians and soldiers.217  In war, 
death of innocents, both while under arms and at the hand of military 
discipline, is a very real possibility.  This risk strongly counsels against 
the expansion of such rudimentary tribunals beyond the theatre of 
combat.  Once military jurisdiction over criminal proceedings is 
unmoored from the confines of the war zone, it threatens the precarious 
balance of power between the Executive and Judiciary.218   
The separation of powers is exceedingly limited in a war zone.  The 
Executive, as commander in chief, is the primary authority.219  In the 
immediate zone of combat, the Executive assumes nearly plenary control 
over the day-to-day conduct of military forces.  Thus, when the military 
is called upon to assume the temporary guise of quasi-civilian authority, 
that power is ultimately exercised by the President, even when Congress 
consents to the use of such power.  As Professor David Bederman has 
observed, “[i]t was recognized at an early juncture in American practice 
that a provisional military government should be vested with executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers; although, owing to military necessity, 
these powers usually could not be separated into different institutions 
exercising checks and balances on each other.”220  Thus, as with consular 
courts, the trinity of government powers is commingled.  
“[W]hatever may be the limits of the military power” when acting 
as an interim government, “it certainly must include the authority to 
establish courts of justice, which are so essential a part of any 
government.”221  While such tribunals pose the risk of injustice in their 
limited sphere of application,222 they do not pose a greater risk to the 
 
(“Anciently, when two nations were at war, the conqueror had or asserted the right to take from his 
enemy his life, liberty, and property; if either was spared, it was as a favor or act of mercy.”).   
 217.  See Military Commissions, supra note 216, at 308 (“War in its mildest form is horrible; 
but take away from the contending armies the ability and right to organize [military tribunals], they 
would soon become monster savages, unrestrained by any and all ideas of law and justice.”).   
 218.  James Madison argued that the proliferation of military jurisdiction will “gradually 
poison” the “very fountain” of civil liberty.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 308-09 (James Madison) 
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).   
 219.  The chief war power possessed by Congress (in addition to the obvious power over 
funding) is the exclusive authority to declare war.  While this power is often regarded as 
anachronistic, in my view it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for triggering the full panoply 
of “War Powers” contemplated by the Constitution.  See infra Part VII.B.3.   
 220.  Bederman, supra note 17, at 852.   
 221.  Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 266 (1909). 
 222.  In his opinion endorsing the trial of the Lincoln conspirators by military commission, 
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separation of powers because they do not divest the Judiciary of any 
role.  By definition, such tribunals only possess jurisdiction over 
territories “having available . . . no other tribunal.”223  As with the 
consular courts sanctioned in Ross, such commingling of powers, while 
justifiable in distant locales where constitutionally contemplated Article 
III courts are wholly unavailable, is “the very acme of absolutism” when 
brought to our own shores or in close proximity thereto.224   
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY JURISDICTION 
A. Ex parte Milligan and the “Open Court” Rule 
In Ex parte Milligan,225 the Supreme Court confronted for the first 
time the constitutionality of a military-commission trial conducted 
outside the confines of a theatre of war or insurrection.226  Lambdin 
Milligan allegedly belonged to a pro-Confederate “secret society” 
known as the “Sons of Liberty” — an insurgent organization President 
Johnson had concluded was bent on “overthrowing the Government and 
duly constituted authorities of the United States.”227  In 1864, Army 
officers arrested Milligan at his Indiana home and brought him before a 
military commission in Indianapolis.228  The Government charged him 
with “violat[ing] . . . the laws of war” by “communicat[ing]” and 
“conspir[ing]” with “the enemy” and “the Sons of Liberty” to “seize 
munitions of war stored in [Union] arsenals” and “to liberate 
[Confederate] prisoners of war.”229  The commission convicted Milligan 
and promptly sentenced him and two co-defendants to hang.230   
Milligan’s case reached the Supreme Court as a petition for habeas 
corpus in the spring of 1866.  As in Korematsu, the Court confronted 
grave doubt whether military authorities would honor a judgment in 
 
Attorney General Speed acknowledged that “[i]t would be a miracle if the records and history of 
this war do not show occasional cases in which those tribunals have erred.”  Military Commissions, 
11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 308-309 (1865).   
 223.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006) (emphasis added).  
 224.  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 11 (1956) (plurality opinion). 
 225.  71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).   
 226.  While the military-commission trials of Henry Wirtz and the Lincoln conspirators are 
frequently cited as historical examples of military commissions convened outside the theatres of 
war, the judiciary reviewed neither of these cases.   
 227.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at  4.   
 228.  Id. at 68.   
 229.  Id. at 4. 
 230.  Id. at 68. 
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Milligan’s favor.  The Court decided the case just nine months after the 
executions of four Confederate sympathizers convicted by military 
commission of conspiring with John Wilkes Booth to assassinate 
President Lincoln.231  At the time of the Lincoln conspirators’ trial, “the 
civil courts were open and held their regular sessions.”232  The 
Government had premised military jurisdiction over the conspirators on 
the same legal theory invoked by Milligan’s commission.233  When the 
Court heard the Milligan case it could not confirm whether Milligan was 
even still alive.234  Tacitly acknowledging these pressures, Justice Davis 
observed,  
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow 
that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct 
conclusion of a purely judicial question.  Then considerations of safety 
were mingled with the exercise of power; and feelings and interests 
prevailed which are happily terminated.  Now that the public safety is 
assured, this question as well as all others, can be discussed and 
decided without passion or the admixture of any element not required 
to form a legal judgment.235   
Observing that “[n]o graver question was ever considered by this 
court,”236 Milligan began by reaffirming that where a military 
commission possesses proper jurisdiction over a defendant, “it is not our 
province to interfere.”237  But if the commission’s jurisdiction is 
constitutionally defective, it is the Court’s “duty to declare the nullity of 
the whole proceedings.”238  
 
 231.  Thomas D. Morris, Military Justice in the South, 1865-1868: South Carolina as a Test 
Case, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511, 526 (noting that the Lincoln conspirators were executed on July 7, 
1865). 
 232.  Military Commissions, supra note 216, at 297.   
 233.  See id. at 314-15 (“A bushwacker, a jayhawker, a bandit, a war rebel, an assassin, being 
public enemies, may be tried, condemned, and executed as offenders against the laws of war . . . . 
The judge of a civil court is not more strongly bound under the Constitution and the law to try a 
criminal than is the military to try an offender against the laws of war.”).   
 234.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 75 (noting the government’s argument that “this case is ended, as the 
presumption is, that Milligan was hanged in pursuance of the order of the President”).  
 235.  Id. at 69 (emphasis omitted).  Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu persuasively 
illustrates the hazards of deciding such fundamental matters when the temper to the times did not 
allow sufficient calmness in deliberation.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting).   
 236.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 75.   
 237.  Id.   
 238.  Id. 
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Applying a straightforward textual analysis, the Court concluded 
that “[t]he provisions of” the Constitution “on the administration of 
criminal justice are too plain and direct, to leave room for 
misconstruction or doubt of their true meaning.”239  First, the Court 
found that the commission necessarily exercised distinctively Judicial 
power because “[e]very trial involves the exercise of judicial power” 
within the meaning of Article III.240  Hence, the commission lacked the 
authority to try Milligan because “no part of [the] judicial power . . . was 
conferred” on it, as it was not an Article III court.241     
Second, in addition to the separation of powers problems, the Court 
concluded that the commission trial violated several of Milligan’s 
fundamental constitutional rights.  Specifically, by exercising 
jurisdiction over Milligan, the commission trespassed upon: 
(1) Article III’s guarantee that “the trial of all crimes, except in 
case of impeachment, shall be by jury”242;  
(2) the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee “that no person shall be held 
to answer for a capital . . . crime unless on presentment by a 
grand jury”; and prohibition against the “depriv[ation] of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law”243; and 
(3) the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees of “the right of trial by jury, 
in such manner and with such regulations that with upright 
judges, impartial juries, and an able bar, the innocent will be 
saved and the guilty punished”; as well as “the right to a speedy 
and public trial . . . .”244 
The Court noted that the Fifth Amendment excuses the jury trial 
and presentment requirements in “cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public 
danger.”245  But Milligan was not a member of the armed forces.  Nor 
 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 76 (1866). 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. at 75. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. at 77.  The Court explained, “[t]he discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army 
and navy, required other and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts,” 
as such pursuant to the courts martial clause, servicemen “while thus serving, surrender[] [their] 
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did his affiliation with the “Sons of Liberty” or his alleged conspiracy 
with Confederate forces bring him within the ambit of military 
jurisdiction.246   
The Court buttressed its conclusions on the Anglo-American 
judiciary’s historic struggle to protect its jurisdiction from military 
encroachment.   
[P]recedent[] inform[s] us of the extent of the struggle to preserve 
liberty and to relieve those in civil life from military trials.  The 
founders of our government were familiar with the history of that 
struggle; and secured in a written constitution every right which the 
people had wrested from power during a contest of ages.  By that 
Constitution and the laws authorized by it this question must be 
determined.247   
In recognition of this long-standing wariness of military 
jurisdiction, Milligan established what has become known as the “open 
court” rule.248  As the Court explained, “the laws and usages of 
war . . . can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the 
authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their 
process unobstructed.”249  Because “in Indiana the Federal authority was 
always unopposed, and its courts always open to hear criminal 
accusations and redress grievances,” the constitutional prerequisites of 
military jurisdiction did not exist.250   
Despite the constitutional commitment to the separation of powers, 
and the express prohibitions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 
Milligan did not find that military commissions per se are 
unconstitutional.  Rather, consistent with the territory-based military 
commission models later identified by the Hamdan Court, Milligan 
noted that military jurisdiction could constitutionally substitute for 
civilian authority when actual hostilities precluded operation of the 
courts:  
[i]f, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and 
it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then on 
 
right to be tried by the civil courts.”  Id. at 78. 
 246.  Id. at 77. 
 247.  Id. at 75. 
 248.  Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 328 (1946).   
 249.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 76. 
 250.  Id.  The Court noted: “[S]oon after this military tribunal was ended the Circuit Court met, 
peacefully transacted its business, and adjourned.  It needed no bayonets to protect it, and required 
no military aid to execute its judgments.”  Id. at 77. 
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the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, 
there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus 
overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no 
power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule 
until the laws can have their free course.251 
But the Court cautioned that this exception is subject to the strictest 
spatial and temporal limitations:   
[a]s necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this 
[military] government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a 
gross usurpation of power.  Martial rule can never exist where the 
courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their 
jurisdiction.  It is also confined to the locality of actual war.252   
This is an exceedingly strict standard.  As the Court explained 
eighty years later in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,253 the mere threat of 
invasion cannot justify resort to military jurisdiction.  In Duncan, the 
petitioner challenged a criminal conviction issued by a military court in 
Hawaii after authorities closed the islands’ civilian courts in the 
aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack.  The military premised the closure 
on fears that a full blown Japanese invasion of the islands was imminent.  
The Supreme Court struck down the conviction for want of jurisdiction.  
Relying on Milligan, the Court explained that “the civil courts must be 
utterly incapable of trying criminals or of dispensing justice in their 
usual manner before the Bill of Rights may be temporarily 
suspended.”254   
These prohibitions ultimately find their footing in Madisonian 
separation of powers principles.  Foretelling Justice Black’s observation 
that the commingling of Judicial and Executive power constitutes “the 
very acme of absolutism,”255  Milligan observed that “[the Framers] 
knew — the history of the world told them — the nation they were 
 
 251.  Id. at 80 (emphasis added).   
 252.  Id. at 80 (emphasis added).  In this respect, military tribunals resemble legislative courts.  
Once a territory is admitted as a State, the jurisdiction of the legislative courts immediately divests.  
Brenner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235 (1850). 
 253.  327 U.S. 304 (1946).  At the time Duncan was decided, the Supreme Court had 
proclaimed Hawaii to be an “incorporated” territory.  Act of April 30, 1900, 56 Cong. ch. 339, 31 
Stat. 141.  While I do not contend that Guantanamo Bay is an “incorporated” territory, this fact is in 
my view not determinative because I do not view Guantanamo as having proper geographic 
jurisdiction over trials conducted under the MCA for the reasons explained in Part II and Part III.A.     
 254.  Duncan, 327 U.S. at 330 (emphasis added). 
 255.  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 11 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
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founding . . . would be involved in war; . . . and that unlimited power 
wherever lodged at such a time was especially hazardous to freeman.”256  
For this reason, they infused the Constitution with internally limiting 
features to prevent the accumulation of too much power in a single hand 
and imposed fundamental procedural safeguards.257  “Not one of these 
safeguards can the President or Congress, or the Judiciary disturb, 
except the one concerning the writ of habeas corpus.”258  It is only “[b]y 
the protection of the law [that] human rights are secured; withdraw that 
protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers or the clamor of an 
excited people.”259   
Milligan made clear the Judiciary’s manifest province to declare 
“what the law is,”260 entails the concomitant obligation to act as guardian 
of constitutional rights when the rule of law is threatened:   
[w]hen peace prevails, and the authority of the government is 
undisputed, there is no difficulty of preserving the safeguards of 
liberty; for the ordinary modes of trial are never neglected, and no one 
wishes it otherwise; but if society is disturbed by civil commotion — if 
the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law weakened, if 
not disregarded — these safeguards need, and should receive, the 
watchful care of those entrusted with the guardianship of the 
Constitution and laws.261  
Until the advent of World War II, courts and commentators treated 
Milligan’s bright-line limitations as an article of faith: The constitutional 
restraints on military jurisdiction dictated that a “[military commission] 
trial must be had within the theatre of war . . .; that, if held elsewhere, 
and where the civil courts are open and available, the proceedings and 
sentence w[ould] be coram non judice.”262   
 
 256.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 79.   
 257.  On this point, Justice Davis noted,  
This nation . . . cannot always remain at peace, and has no right to expect that it will 
always have wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the 
Constitution.  Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of 
law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right is 
conceded and the calamities of war again befall us, the dangers to human liberty are 
frightful to contemplate.   
Id. 
 258.  Id. at 79 (emphasis added).   
 259.  Id. at 75.   
 260.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).   
 261.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 78.  
 262.  WINTHROP, supra note 192, at 836, quoted in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 598 
n.29 (2006).  
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B. Ex parte Quirin 
For seventy-six years Milligan’s “open court” rule went 
unchallenged.  At the height of World War II the rule came before the 
Court again when it confronted Ex parte Quirin in 1942.  Quirin called 
upon the Justices to decide the fate of eight German servicemen captured 
on the American mainland on a mission to commit acts of sabotage.  
President Roosevelt ordered that the alleged saboteurs be tried by a 
military commission even though Article III courts were open and 
available to try them.   
The Quirin Court, like Milligan before and Korematsu after, 
confronted the prospect of judicial futility.  Historians now claim that 
President Roosevelt directed his Attorney General, Francis Biddle, to 
privately instruct the Court that the Executive would not comply with an 
order in the petitioners’ favor.263  The President reportedly intoned: “I 
won’t hand them over to any United States marshal armed with a writ of 
habeas corpus.”264  Biddle told Justice Roberts of the President’s 
intentions, and Roberts in turn relayed the information to his brothers.265  
Roberts informed his colleagues that he believed that the President 
would execute the petitioners, irrespective of the Court’s ruling.266  
Chief Justice Stone was reportedly distressed by this prospect.267  Noting 
some of the questionable circumstances surrounding the case, Justice 
Scalia candidly acknowledged in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld268 that Quirin “was 
not this Court’s finest hour.”269   
1. Quirin’s Factual Background 
In the summer of 1942, eight German servicemen landed on 
American shores under cover of darkness.  Delivered by submarine, they 
acted on orders “to destroy war industries and war facilities in the United 
 
 263.  Belknap, supra note 47, at 476 (citing David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 61, 68 (1996)).  Biddle later said of President Roosevelt’s war-time decisions that “[t]he 
Constitution has not bothered any wartime President.”  FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 
(1962), quoted in David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights 
in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2591 (2003).   
 264.  Belknap, supra note 47, at 476 (citing Danelski, supra note 263, at 68).   
 265.  Id. (citing Danelski, supra note 263, at 69).   
 266.  Id. (citing Danelski, supra note 263, at 69).   
 267.  Id. (citing Danelski, supra note 263, at 72).   
 268.  542 U.S. 507 (2004).   
 269.  Id. at 569 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
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States.”270  Four landed on Long Island on June 13; the remaining four at 
Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida on June 17.271   
Though German nationals, each of the men had previously lived in 
the United States.272  One, Herbert Haupt, was an American citizen.273  
Wearing German Marine Infantry uniforms, they arrived carrying 
explosives, fuses, and incendiary and timing devices.274  “Immediately 
after landing they buried their uniforms and the other articles,” including 
the explosives.275  Proceeding in civilian dress, the Long Island party 
initially traveled to New York City; the Florida party to Jacksonville.276  
Later, they departed “to various points in the United States.”277  On June 
22, 1942, two of these men, George Dasch and Earnest Burger, 
confessed their plans to the authorities in Washington, D.C.278  F.B.I. 
agents then arrested their comrades separately in New York and 
Chicago.279   
On July 2, 1942, President Roosevelt appointed a military 
commission to try the saboteurs.280  The President’s order prescribed 
regulations for the trial’s procedure and for review of the record and of 
any judgment or sentence.281  The following day, July 3, the Government 
formally charged the defendants with: 
 
 270.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942).  
 271.  Id.     
 272.  Id. at 20. 
 273.  Id.   
 274.  Id. at 21.   
 275.  Id.     
 276.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942). 
 277.  Id.     
 278.  Belknap, supra note 47, at 478; Joseph R. Thysell, Jr., Ex parte Quirin: The Case for 
Military Commissions, 31 S.U. L. REV. 129, 142 (2004).  The F.B.I.’s handling of the case was less 
than ideal.  After agreeing with Burger to confess their plans, Dasch initially called the local F.B.I. 
field office in New York, where an agent recorded his confession but took no action on it.  Belknap, 
supra note 47, at 477-78.  Dasch later traveled to the Bureau’s Washington, D.C. office to turn 
himself in, where his story was met with great skepticism.  Id. at 478.  Despite these lapses, Director 
J. Edgar Hoover furthered the myth that the saboteurs’ plans were thwarted by the F.B.I.’s covert 
operations.  Id.  Fear that the F.B.I.’s mishandling of the case would become public may have 
influenced the decision to try the saboteurs by military commission where the evidence introduced 
would remain secret.  An F.B.I. agent testified at the commission trial that the Bureau sought a 
presidential pardon for Dasch in exchange for his agreement not to testify about his role as an 
informant in the case.  Id.   
 279.  Belknap, supra note 47, at 477-78.   
 280.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22.   
 281.  Id.  The President also ordered that  
all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United 
States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such nation, and who 
during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States . . . and are charged with 
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1.  Violation of the law of war; 
2.  Violation of Article 81 of the Articles of War, defining the offense 
of relieving or attempting to relieve, or corresponding with or giving 
intelligence to, the enemy; 
3.  Violation of Article 82, defining the offense of spying; 
4.  Conspiracy to commit offenses alleged in charges 1, 2 and 3.282 
The trial began five days later, on July 8.283  The defendants 
promptly moved to dismiss the charges for want of jurisdiction, and the 
commission rejected the motion.284  On July 27, evidence closed 
awaiting counsels’ closing arguments.285  On July 28, the defendants 
sought habeas relief in district court, asserting that Milligan precluded 
the commission’s jurisdiction.286  Their application admitted that they 
had “landed on the coast of the United States in June, 1942, from a 
German submarine, with explosives,” under German orders “to use for 
the purpose of committing sabotage on certain American industries.”287  
The district court promptly denied relief.288  The next day, July 29, the 
Supreme Court held a special session to consider the habeas 
application.289  Two days later, on July 31, the Court issued a per curiam 
order denying the petitioners’ application without elaboration.290     
On August 1 the commission heard closing arguments.291  After 
two days of deliberation, the panel found the defendants guilty and 
sentenced them to death.292  On August 4, President Roosevelt approved 
the commission’s findings, but commuted the sentences of the 
informants, Dasch and Burger, to prison terms of thirty years and life, 
 
committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike 
acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals.  
Id. at 22-23. 
 282.  Id. at 23. 
 283.  Id.     
 284.  Anthony F. Renzo, Making a Burlesque of the Constitution: Military Trials of Civilians 
in the War Against Terrorism, 31 VT. L. REV. 447, 492-93 (2007). 
 285.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23.   
 286.  Renzo, supra note 284, at 493.   
 287.  Ex parte Quirin, 47 F. Supp. 431, 431 (D.D.C. 1942). 
 288.  Id.     
 289.  Renzo, supra note 284, at 493.   
 290.  Id.; Belknap, supra note 47, at 474. 
 291.  Renzo, supra note 284, at 494; Belknap, supra note 47, at 474.   
 292.  Renzo, supra note 284, at 494.   
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respectively.293  On August 8, 1942 — just fifty-seven days after their 
capture — federal authorities executed the remaining six defendants by 
electrocution in Washington, D.C.294  On October 29, 1942 (eighty-two 
days after the executions), the Supreme Court finally issued its written 
opinion.295  The decision conspicuously omitted any mention of the 
petitioners’ fates.   
2. The Quirin Decision 
The Quirin petitioners argued that the President lacked both 
statutory and constitutional authority to subject them to military 
jurisdiction.  Addressing the statutory issue, the Court concluded that 
Congress provided the requisite authority in the Articles of War.296     
With regard to the constitutional question, the Court noted that 
“Congress and the President, like the courts, possess no power not 
derived from the Constitution.”297  The Court addressed the 
constitutional issue by examining the respective war-making powers of 
Congress and the President.  The Court noted Congress’ powers,  
(1) To provide for the common Defence; 
(2) To raise and support Armies; 
(3) To provide and maintain a Navy; 
(4) To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces; 
(5) To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; 
(6) To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations; 
(7) To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by 
 
 293.  Id.  President Truman pardoned Dasch and Burger in 1948 and the two were deported to 
Germany.  Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military 
Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 739 n.579 (2002).   
 294.  Renzo, supra note 284, at 494.   
 295.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 1 (1942).  
 296.  Id. at 26-27 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593).   
 297.  Id. at 25. 
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this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.298 
The Court then noted the President’s war-making powers. 
The Constitution confers on the President the “executive Power,” Art. 
II, § 1, cl. 1, and imposes on him the duty to “take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.”  Art. II, § 3.  It makes him the Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy, Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and empowers him to 
appoint and commission officers of the United States. Art. II, § 3, 
cl. 1.299  
Quirin found that when synergized, these powers combined to yield the 
power to convene military commissions.   
The Constitution . . . invests the President, as Commander in Chief, 
with the power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry 
into effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for 
the government and regulation of the Armed Forces, and all laws 
defining and punishing offenses against the law of nations, including 
those which pertain to the conduct of war.300  
Quirin left open the question “to what extent the President as 
Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military 
commissions without the support of Congressional legislation.”301  The 
Court concluded that Congress, in enacting the Articles of War,302 
“sanction[ed], within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of 
military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according 
to . . . the law[s] of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.”303  In short, 
the Articles of War “incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction 
of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the 
law of war.”304  And the President “by his Proclamation in time of 
war . . . invoked that law.”305 
Quirin found that the “common law of war” recognized a 
fundamental distinction between “lawful” and “unlawful” combatants:306   
 
 298.  Id. at 26.  
 299.  Id. 
 300.  Id. 
 301.  Id. at  29.  
 302.  10 U.S.C.A §§ 1471-1593 (1946).   
 303.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28.   
 304.  Id. at 30.   
 305.  Id. at 28.   
 306.  Id. at 35.   
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By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a 
distinction between . . . those who are lawful and unlawful combatants.  
Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of 
war by opposing military forces.  Unlawful combatants are likewise 
subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial 
and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their 
belligerency unlawful.307   
The Petitioners’ status as combatants was conclusively established 
because they conceded in their habeas petition that they “landed on the 
coast of the United States in June, 1942, from a German submarine, with 
explosives,” under orders “to use for the purpose of committing sabotage 
on certain American industries.”308  Thus, the commission possessed 
jurisdiction to try them for alleged acts of unlawful combatancy:   
[A]n enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through 
the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or 
property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally 
deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be 
offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by 
military tribunals.309   
The Court’s apparent constitutionalization of “law of war” 
jurisdiction appears to raise tensions with Milligan.  There too, the 
Government expressly charged the defendant with “violat[ing] . . . 
the laws of war.”310  Tacitly acknowledging this tension, Quirin 
distinguished Milligan by cryptically noting that some “offenses against 
the law of war,” nonetheless, fall into a “class of offenses 
constitutionally triable only by a jury.”311  The offense at issue in 
 
 307.  Id. at 30-31.  
 308.  Ex parte Quirin, 47 F. Supp. 431, 431 (D.D.C. 1942).   
 309.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. 
 310.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6 (1866) (emphasis added). 
 311.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.  Quirin offered two criteria to distinguish Milligan.  See id.  
Quirin found that under Milligan’s open-court rule, a defendant is not amenable to military 
jurisdiction where he is accused of a crime that is either (1) “not recognized by our courts as 
violat[ive] of the law of war,” or (2) “of that class of offenses constitutionally triable only by a 
jury.”  Id.  The first factor could not have applied to Milligan because he was plainly charged with 
“communicat[ing]” and “conspir[ing]” with “the enemy” and “the Sons of Liberty” to “seize 
munitions of war stored in [federal] arsenals” and “to liberate [Confederate] prisoners of war.”  
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 4.  These are well-recognized examples of crimes punishable under the laws of 
war.  WINTHROP, supra note 192, at 840.  Thus, according to Quirin, Milligan’s right to an Article 
III tribunal necessarily arose from the conclusion that his alleged crimes were “of that class of 
offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury.”  See infra Part VII.A.   
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Milligan — while seemingly constituting a violation of the law of 
war — still fell outside the ambit of military jurisdiction.  Conversely, 
the Quirin defendants “were charged with an offense against the law of 
war which the Constitution does not require to be tried by jury.”312  In 
other words, Quirin did not find that military-commission jurisdiction 
constitutionally extended to the entire body of offenses recognized by 
the common law of war.  After Quirin, law-of-war offenses remain that 
must be tried by Article III courts.   
The opinion provided little elaboration as to what exactly 
distinguished the Milligan and Quirin defendants.  The Court simply 
stated that it “construed the [Milligan] Court’s statement as to the 
inapplicability of the law of war . . . as having particular reference to the 
facts before it.”313  On the basis of those facts, the Milligan Court 
“concluded that Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the 
armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law 
of war save as — in circumstances found not there to be present and not 
involved here — martial law might be constitutionally established.”314   
Quirin’s attempt to distinguish Milligan in this respect is 
disingenuous.  The Milligan Court did not make a factual finding as to 
the defendant’s combatancy status.  The Government expressly charged 
Milligan with, among other things, “violat[ing] . . . the laws of war” by 
“conspir[ing]” with “the enemy” and “the Sons of Liberty” to “seize 
munitions of war stored in [federal] arsenals; [and] to liberate 
[Confederate] prisoners of war . . . .”315  As Justice Thomas recently 
observed in his Hamdan dissent, under the common law of war, 
“unlawful combatants” include “[i]rregular armed bodies or persons not 
forming part of the organized forces of a belligerent who would not be 
 
 312.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.  In reaching the conclusion that the Framers did not intend to 
subject military-commission trials to the requirements of Article III or the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, the Court analogized to other constitutionally recognized criminal proceedings where 
these provisions are inapplicable.   
No exception is necessary to exclude from the operation of these provisions cases never 
deemed to be within their terms.  An express exception from Article III, § 2, and from 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, of trials of petty offenses and of criminal contempts 
has not been found necessary in order to preserve the traditional proactive of trying those 
offenses without a jury.  It is no more so in order to continue the practice of trying, 
before military tribunals without a jury, offenses committed by enemy belligerents 
against the law of war.   
Id. at 41.  
 313.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45. 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 4.   
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likely to respect the laws of war.”316  Milligan and his alleged 
companions in the “Sons of Liberty” would seem to meet this definition.  
Indeed, their alleged plan to wreak havoc behind the Union lines 
resembles both the Quirin plot to sabotage war industries and the modus 
operandi of the plain-clothes operatives employed by modern terrorist 
organizations.  Yet, Milligan concluded that they did not meet the 
constitutional prerequisites for military jurisdiction.    
Ultimately, Quirin replaced the formerly crystalline “open court” 
rule with a very muddy jurisdictional boundary lying somewhere 
between its own facts and those of Milligan.  Exactly where this 
metaphysical radius lies remains a mystery.  Quirin expressly declined 
to provide further elaboration.  “We have no occasion now to define 
with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of 
military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war.”317  Only by 
unraveling this ambiguity can the MCA’s constitutionality be judged.   
C. Post-Quirin Military Commissions Decisions 
1. In re Yamashita 
Relying on the authority established by Quirin, the Supreme Court 
further expanded the jurisdiction of law-of-war commissions in In re 
Yamashita.318  There, the Court sanctioned the military trial of a 
Japanese general charged with failing to prevent atrocities committed by 
his subordinates in the Philippines.319  General Yamashita was tried 
before a military commission in the Philippines after the cessation of 
hostilities but before a formal declaration of peace.320  He argued that the 
end of the fighting precluded military jurisdiction.  The Court rejected 
this argument, finding that military commissions retain jurisdiction “to 
 
 316.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 668 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added) (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 192, at 783-84).   
 317.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46.   
 318.  327 U.S. 1 (1946).  
 319.  Id. at 13-14. General Yamashita’s charge read:  
[W]hile commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United States of America 
and its allies, [Yamashita] unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as 
commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them 
to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United States and 
of its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he . . . thereby violated 
the laws of war.  
Id.  
 320.  Id. at 13.   
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try violations of the law of war committed before [the] cessation [of 
hostilities], at least until peace has been officially recognized by treaty or 
proclamation of the political branch of the Government.”321  Because 
neither Congress nor the President had formally “proclaimed” peace, the 
military retained jurisdiction to try General Yamashita.322  The Army 
hanged him in the Philippines just three weeks after the Court delivered 
its decision.323   
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
Quirin-type military jurisdiction lay dormant for more than fifty 
years following World War II.  Military commissions were not utilized 
in the Korean or Vietnam Wars.324   As previously discussed, President 
Bush disinterred the doctrine as a tool to try suspected terrorists 
following the invasion of Afghanistan.  In Hamdan, the Supreme Court 
struck down the President’s unilateral action as a violation of implied 
congressional prohibitions.325  The majority, plurality, and dissenting 
opinions quarreled over, among other things:  
(1) whether the Court possessed statutory habeas jurisdiction to 
hear the case;326  
(2) the scope of congressional authorization to convene military 
commissions;327 and 
(3) the types of offenses triable under the laws of war.328   
Despite their lack of consensus on these issues, all the opinions 
ignored the Article III premises at the heart of Milligan, treating the 
matter as a purely statutory question.  Each of the opinions accepted as a 
matter of faith that the power to try Hamdan by military commission 
resides somewhere on the spectrum of authority conferred by Articles I 
 
 321.  Id. at 12.  This finding stands in tension with Milligan’s proscription that the continued 
exercise of military jurisdiction “after the courts are reinstated . . . is a gross usurpation of power.”  
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 80 (1866).   
 322.  Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 12.   
 323.  Edward J. Klaris, The Press and the Public’s First Amendment Right of Access to 
Terrorism on Trial: A Position Paper, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 767, 790 (2005). 
 324.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 617 (2006).  
 325.  Id. at 581, 635. 
 326.  See id. at 557-80.  See also id. at 655-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  While the MCA plainly 
revoked habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees, the plurality concluded that the MCA’s 
revocation did not apply retroactively to cases pending before the MCA’s enactment.  See id. at 
557-80. 
 327.  See id. at 592-94.  See also id. at 678-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 328.  See id. at 601-05.  See also id. at 688-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
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and II.329  At the outset of his majority opinion, Justice Stevens casually 
accepted Hamdan’s concession that “a court-martial constituted in 
 
 329.  I read the Hamdan opinions to resolve the case on the basis of the schema offered by 
Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  In fact, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion did so explicitly.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 638 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  Youngstown addressed President Truman’s unilateral seizure of the American steel 
industry when a labor dispute threatened production during the height of the Korean War.  
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-83.  The Court struck down the President’s action.  Id. at 589.  In his 
oft-quoted concurring opinion, Jackson asserted that “Presidential powers are not fixed but 
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”  Id. at 635 
(Jackson, J., concurring).  He offered a template to evaluate the scope of presidential power in such 
cases.  This methodology was later applied by a majority of the Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
453 U.S. 654, 661, 674 (1981).  Under Justice Jackson’s schema:  
1.  When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, 
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus 
all that Congress can delegate . . . .    
2.  When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of 
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain . . . .  
3.  When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will 
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter . . . . 
Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized 
with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system.     
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).  Jackson ultimately 
concluded that the seizure fell within the third category because prior statutes impliedly prohibited 
the President’s action.  “Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field,” Jackson 
wrote, “but has covered it by . . . statutory policies inconsistent with th[e] seizure.”  Id. at 639.  
Because the seizure power did not fall within preclusive executive authority, the Court invalidated 
the President’s order.  Id. at 660.  Similarly, Hamdan struck down President Bush’s executive order 
because Congress, in enacting the UCMJ, had impliedly prohibited the President’s invocation of 
military commission jurisdiction over Hamdan.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 579-80;  see also id. at 636 
(Breyer, J., concurring).  As Justice Kennedy noted, “Congress, in the proper exercise of its 
powers . . . has considered the subject of military tribunals and set limits on the President’s 
authority.”  Id. at 636-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Kennedy concluded that “Hamdan’s military 
commission exceed[ed] the bounds Congress ha[d] placed on the President’s authority in . . . the 
UCMJ.”  Id. at 653.  But he added that “[i]f Congress, after due consideration, deems it appropriate 
to change the controlling statutes . . . it has the power and prerogative to do so.”  Id. at 637.  I posit 
that this assertion is fundamentally erroneous.  For an invocation of power to be evaluated on 
Justice Jackson’s doctrinal spectrum, it must be one that resides either among Congress’ Article I 
authority or the President’s Article II domain.  Powers specifically invested in the Judiciary do not 
belong to either of these actors and cannot be divested — with or without congressional consent.  
Justice Jackson’s very premise acknowledges that a “zone of twilight” exists “in which [the 
President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”  
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).  The power to conduct criminal trials is far 
removed from this “zone of twilight.”  This power falls squarely within the province of the 
Judiciary.  “It is the primary, indeed the sole business of [Article III] courts to try cases and 
controversies between individuals and between individuals and the Government.  This includes 
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accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice . . . would have 
authority to try him.”330  But the Article III premises underlying Milligan 
dictate otherwise.331   
The Hamdan Court first rejected the Government’s argument that 
Congress’ enactment of the Authorization for Use of Military Force332 
and Detainee Treatment Act333 impliedly authorized the President’s use 
of military commissions to try suspected terrorists.334  The dissenters 
disagreed with this conclusion.335  The Court then surveyed the authority 
to empanel military commissions conferred upon the President by the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice336 (“UCMJ”).  The majority concluded 
that the UCMJ “acknowledge[s] a general Presidential authority to 
convene military commissions in circumstances . . . justified under . . . 
the law of war.”337  The majority further noted that the statute 
specifically required that military commissions must provide the same 
procedural protections afforded to American servicemen tried by general 
courts-martial unless such provisions were “impracticable.”338  The 
dissenting Justices accepted these propositions.339  Ultimately, the 
Justices simply divided over whether Hamdan’s charges fell within the 
purview of the common law of war, and whether full compliance with 
court-martial safeguards would be sufficiently “impracticable” within 
the meaning of the UCMJ to warrant the truncated procedures dictated 
by the President’s order.340  Concluding that Congress had impliedly 
denied the President the power to convene military commissions of the 
sort contemplated, the Court struck down his order.341   
 
criminal trials.”  United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) (emphasis added). 
 330.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.  
 331.  See infra Part VII.B.3.a.(2).   
 332.  Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).   
 333.  Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).   
 334.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593-94.   
 335.  Id. at 681-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 336.  10 U.S.C.S. §§ 801-839 (Lexis 2006).   
 337.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594-95.   
 338.  Id. at 622.   
 339.  Id. at 683 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 340.  Id. at 583-85.  Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion also concluded that by incorporating the 
common law of war, the UCMJ impliedly adopted the prohibitions of Common Article III of the 
Geneva Convention, requiring enemy combatants be tried before “regularly constituted” courts.  
Justice Stevens concluded that this provision required that enemy combatants receive the same 
process afforded to U.S. servicemen facing courts-martial.  Id. at 613-15. 
 341.  Id. at 583-84.    
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VII. RECONCILING MILLIGAN WITH QUIRIN 
For all its sound and fury, Hamdan addressed few of the 
constitutional questions underlying the exercise of military jurisdiction.  
In relying solely upon whether the offenses at issue fell within the ambit 
of the statutorily authorized “law of war” jurisdiction, Hamdan wholly 
ignored Quirin’s recognition that pursuant to Milligan some “law of 
war” offenses constitutionally must be tried by Article III courts.  The 
constitutional question posed by the inherent tension between Milligan 
and Quirin remains an open one.   
Milligan and Quirin stand at competing poles, each exerting its own 
gravity upon future cases.  The tension between the policies underlying 
the two decisions invests the Court with considerable leeway, depending 
on the policy it might choose to emphasize.  The facts surrounding the 
rendition of judgment in Quirin are open to great suspicion.  
Nonetheless, the decision does not need to be overruled to conclude that 
the MCA runs afoul of the Constitution.  Although it seemingly deprived 
Milligan of much of its vigor, Quirin did not claim to overrule the 
decision or to otherwise change the law.  Rather, as already discussed, 
Quirin purported to distinguish its own facts from those of Milligan.  
Several important but unelaborated legal and factual distinctions 
separating the two decisions could cabin the expansive jurisdiction 
potentially conveyed by Quirin.   
Madison’s foundational premise that the proliferation of military 
jurisdiction will “gradually poison” the “very fountain” of civil 
liberty,342 demonstrates that the text, history, and policy of the 
Constitution favor Milligan over Quirin.  Adherence to Milligan seems 
particularly appropriate because the alternative position rests upon a case 
decided under circumstances strongly suggesting undue presidential 
influence.   
A. Common Features of Milligan and Quirin 
Recall that Quirin distinguished Milligan by noting,  
there are acts regarded . . . by some writers on international law, as 
offenses against the law of war which would not be triable by military 
tribunal here, either because they are not recognized by our courts as 
violations of the law of war or because they are of that class of 
offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury.  It was upon such 
 
 342.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 308-09 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).   
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grounds that the Court denied the right to proceed by military tribunal 
in . . . Milligan . . . . But . . . these petitioners were charged with an 
offense against the law of war which the Constitution does not require 
to be tried by jury.343 
While its explanation is far from clear, it is evident that, in the 
Quirin Court’s view, Milligan’s tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the 
offenses of which he was accused “either” (1) are “not recognized by 
our courts as violations of the law of war,” or (2) are “of that class of 
offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury.”344   
Writing for a plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,345 Justice O’Connor 
suggested that the distinction rested on the fact that Milligan was not 
charged with acts of combatancy as that term is now understood.346  
“Had Milligan been captured while he was assisting Confederate 
soldiers by carrying a rifle against Union troops on a Confederate 
battlefield, the holding of the Court might well have been different.”347  
But this argument ignores the nature of the charges in Milligan.  The 
Government plainly charged Milligan with offenses “recognized by our 
courts as violations of the law of war . . . .”348  Recall that Milligan faced 
charges of “conspiring to overthrow the Government, seize munitions, 
and liberate [Confederate] prisoners of war.”349  As Colonel Winthrop 
recognized, it is well settled that “furnishing [the enemy] with . . . arms” 
and “aiding the escape of [enemy] soldiers held as prisoners of war” are 
paradigmatic violations of the laws and usages of war.350  It is equally 
accepted that “[i]rregular armed bodies or persons not forming part of 
the organized forces of a belligerent” may be held liable for breaches of 
the laws of war.351  Attorney General Speed’s endorsement of the 
military trial of the Lincoln conspirators stressed this point: “That the 
laws of war authorized commanders to create and establish military 
commissions . . . for the trial of offenders against the laws of war, 
 
 343.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942).  
 344.  Id. (emphasis added).   
 345.  542 U.S. 507 (2004).   
 346.  Id. at 521-22. 
 347.  Id. at 522.  
 348.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.   
 349.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 567 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).     
 350.  WINTHROP, supra note 192, at 840.   
 351.  Id. at 783, 784, quoted in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 688 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).   
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whether they be active or secret participants in the hostilities, cannot be 
denied.”352   
Because Milligan was charged with offenses “recognized . . . as 
violations of the laws of war,”353 Quirin’s enigmatic language must be 
read to assert that he was exempt from military jurisdiction because, for 
some reason, the “law of war” offenses for which he was charged 
nonetheless fall within a “class of offenses constitutionally triable only 
by a jury.”354  Assuming that Quirin offered a principled interpretation, 
something about the nature of Milligan’s circumstances required a trial 
before an Article III tribunal.   
From a logistical standpoint, it is perhaps easier to identify Milligan 
and Quirin’s distinguishing features by first examining the important 
jurisdictional facts common to both cases.   
1. Location 
Milligan and Quirin cannot be distinguished on the basis of the 
locus of the alleged crimes or the arrests.  In neither case were the 
defendants apprehended in a war zone.  In Milligan, both the alleged 
misconduct and the defendant’s arrest took place in Indiana.  As the 
Court took great pains to emphasize, at all times Indiana remained loyal 
to the United States and never fell subject to Confederate control or 
martial law.355  Similarly, the F.B.I. arrested the Quirin defendants in 
Washington, D.C., New York, and Chicago for crimes they planned to 
carry out in the United States.356  Thus, in both cases the defendants 
were arrested and tried in locales where, at all times, the courts remained 
open and the machinery of civilian jurisdiction was unimpeded.357   
2. Citizenship 
Milligan was a citizen and resident of Indiana.358  Likewise, one of 
the condemned Quirin petitioners, Herbert Haupt, was also a United 
 
 352.  Military Commissions, supra note 216, at 308 (emphasis added).   
 353.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 4 (1866). 
 354.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942).  
 355.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 76.  
 356.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21. 
 357.  Of course, the Guantanamo detainees (unlike South Carolina detainees) subjected to 
military trial by the MCA are not facing trial in so-called “incorporated” areas of the United States.  
I find this fact indistinguishable for the reasons set forth in Part III.A.   
 358.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 68.   
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States citizen.359  Yet, the Quirin Court made clear that Haupt’s 
citizenship provided him no comfort:   
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not 
relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful 
because in violation of the law of war.  Citizens who associate 
themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with 
its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts 
are enemy belligerents within the meaning of . . . the law of war.360 
Thus, in the eyes of the Quirin Court, Milligan’s citizenship plainly was 
not the critical feature that saved him from the gallows.   
3. Offenses 
The nature of the alleged offenses at issue in Milligan and Quirin 
both constitute violations of the laws of war.  The Quirin defendants 
were accused of conspiring “to destroy war industries and war facilities 
in the United States.”361  Similarly, Milligan was charged with 
“conspiring to overthrow the Government, seize munitions, and liberate 
[Confederate] prisoners of war.”362  Such offenses, whether committed 
by soldiers or civilians, constitute hornbook violations of the laws of 
war.363   
4. Statutory Authorization 
The decisions cannot be reconciled on the basis of Quirin’s 
congressional authorization of military jurisdiction.  In light of the fact 
that “[t]he provisions of” the Constitution “on the administration of 
criminal justice are too plain and direct, to leave room for 
misconstruction or doubt of their true meaning,”364  Milligan expressly 
concluded that “Congress could grant no such power” to the President.365   
 
 359.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20. 
 360.  Id. at 37-38.     
 361.  Id. at 21.   
 362.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 567 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 363.  WINTHROP, supra note 192, at 840. 
 364.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 75 (1866). 
 365.  Id. at 76. 
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B. Jurisdictional Elements that Rendered the Quirin Offenses Subject to 
Military Jurisdiction, While Milligan’s Alleged Crimes Remained 
Within the Exclusive Purview of the Judiciary 
While the offences charged in Milligan and Quirin closely 
resembled one another, careful examination of the decisions yields three 
jurisdictionally significant, distinguishing elements that counsel against 
the constitutionality of the MCA.    
The defendants tried in Quirin (and Yamashita) were:  
(1) admitted enemy combatants; 
(2) members of a state-affiliated military corps; and  
(3) accused of war-crime offenses committed after a formal 
congressional declaration of war.   
Conversely, in Milligan, the defendant: 
(1) disputed his alleged enemy-combatant status; 
(2) was accused of membership in a sub-state insurgent group; and  
(3) was tried for offenses committed in the absence of a formal 
declaration of war. 
I posit that the convergence of these three jurisdictional elements in 
Quirin — the defendants’ admitted combatancy, their membership in a 
state-affiliated military unit, and that their alleged violations of the laws 
of war occurred during the pendency of a congressionally declared 
war — rendered the charges against them “offense[s] against the law of 
war which the Constitution does not require to be tried by jury.”366  
Conversely, the absence of these requisite elements in Milligan dictated 
that the charges there, while “regarded by . . . writers on international 
law as offences against the law of war,” fell within a “class of offenses 
constitutionally triable only by a jury.”367  This conclusion does not 
inherently arise from Quirin.  The Court was deliberately obtuse as to 
the precise elements that distinguished the case from Milligan.  To be 
blunt, the limiting principles I propose no more follow from Quirin than 
Quirin follows from Milligan.  But taken together, these elements 
provide principled bases to reconcile Quirin with Milligan.  Given that 
Quirin and Milligan may not be distinguished on the basis of citizenship, 
the locality of offenses, the nature of the alleged crimes, or 
congressional authorization, if the above-proffered elements do not 
distinguish the decisions, Quirin effectively emasculates Milligan.   
 
 366.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.   
 367.  Id.   
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I suggest that the Court adopt each of these three jurisdictional 
elements as necessary conditions precedent to the exercise of military 
jurisdiction.  Judicial recognition of these elements significantly 
diminishes the threat of military jurisdiction to the separation of powers.  
When established, the legitimacy of military commissions ultimately 
rests on constitutional parity: members of the United States armed forces 
are constitutionally subjected to military jurisdiction.  Members of 
foreign military corps at war with the United States would receive no 
greater protections than our own troops.368  But allowing the exercise of 
such jurisdiction without first satisfying these conditions poses undue 
risk of subjecting civilians to military jurisdiction.   
These limiting principles are consistent with the historical 
application of military jurisdiction.  Recall that the Court has 
traditionally recognized three species of military commissions.369  
Milligan made clear that the constitutional limitations on military 
jurisdiction do not apply to tribunals established either in occupied 
territory or in territory where authorities legitimately declare martial 
law.370  It is only the so-called “law of war” commission that is subject 
to Milligan’s separation-of-powers limitations.  Thus, if Milligan were 
accused of the same offenses in an occupied Confederate State or in a 
district where martial law had been legitimately declared because the 
civil courts could not function, he would have been subject to military 
jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that no other court would have been 
available to try him.371   
Similarly, if the “war on terror” necessitated the temporary 
occupation of foreign territory, the Government could establish military 
commissions in that territory to try offenses committed in that territory.  
If, for example, the Government were to establish a territory-based 
military commission in Afghanistan to try offenses against the law of 
war committed within the occupied territory, these limitations would 
 
 368.  I propose, without venturing to debate the issue here, that the Due Process Clause may 
dictate that when these conditions are met and trial by military commission is proper, the 
Government must offer foreign combatants the same procedural protections guaranteed to American 
servicemen facing courts-martial (as the Geneva Convention requires).  The MCA fails to satisfy 
this condition.  See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948(b)(f), 120 Stat. 
2600, 2602 (2006).  I reserve this issue for a future paper.   
 369.  See supra Part V.   
 370.  By definition, such courts pose no threat to the separation of powers because their 
jurisdiction is limited to locales “having available . . . no other tribunal.”  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 590 (2006). 
 371.  See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 80 (1866).   
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have no application.  The limiting principles I suggest are applicable 
only in extraordinary cases where the Government voluntarily transports 
alleged offenders from a war zone to territory, like Guantanamo, that is 
far removed from hostilities and “is within the constant jurisdiction of 
the United States.”372   
1. For a Defendant to Be Subject to the Jurisdiction of a Law-of-
War Military Commission, His Combatancy Status Must Be 
Affirmatively Established Either By Judicial Admission or By 
De Novo Adjudication Before an Article III Tribunal 
Unlike the less controversial territory-based commissions, law-of-
war commissions have historically been utilized only in cases where the 
defendant’s status as an “enemy combatant” was not in doubt.  The 
historical purpose of law-of-war tribunals has been not to determine 
whether the accused is a “combatant” rather than a civilian, but whether 
as a combatant he has engaged in lawful or unlawful acts of 
belligerency.   
“Combatant” status is a constitutionally necessary element to the 
exercise of law-of-war jurisdiction.373  Such commissions cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over civilians.  Distinguishing Milligan, the 
Yamashita Court went to great pains to point out that “[w]e are not here 
concerned with the power of” a law-of-war commission “to try 
civilians.”374  Rather, the Yamashita commission possessed 
“authority . . . only to try the purported charge of violation of the law of 
war committed by petitioner, an enemy belligerent . . . during time of 
war.”375  As a participant in war, a combatant (whether lawful or 
unlawful) assumes peculiar hazards unknown in civilian life.  Among 
these is the harsh hand of military justice — even at the hands of the 
enemy.376   
Non-combatants, both foreign and domestic, assume no such risk.  
As Yamashita’s qualifying language implies, application of military 
jurisdiction should be limited to situations where the defendant’s 
combatancy status is established.  Such was the case in both Yamashita 
 
 372.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2260 (2008). 
 373.  WINTHROP, supra note 192, at 838.   
 374.  In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946). 
 375.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 376.  See Military Commissions, supra note 216, at 308 (1865) (noting that the judgments of 
military commissions against combatants “have been sometimes harsh, and sometimes even 
tyrannical”).   
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and Quirin — the only Supreme Court decisions to date affirming the 
application of law-of-war commission jurisdiction.   
As noted, General Yamashita conceded that he was a Japanese 
officer who was “in command of a hostile army occupying United States 
territory.”377  Similarly, the Quirin defendants candidly admitted in their 
habeas application that they had “landed on the coast of the United 
States in June, 1942, from a German submarine, with explosives,” under 
German orders “to use for the purpose of committing sabotage on certain 
American industries.”378  Thus, as the Supreme Court expressly 
acknowledged, the Quirin defendants were “admitted enemy 
invaders.”379     
 I do not mean to imply that an obvious enemy combatant can avoid 
military jurisdiction through the simple expediency of denying 
combatancy.  Only that in the extraordinary circumstance where the 
Government seeks to try combatants deliberately removed from the war 
zone to actual or de facto American territory in close proximity to the 
U.S. mainland, Article III courts presumptively possess exclusive 
jurisdiction.  If the defendant does not stipulate his combatancy, the 
Government must bear the burden of proving his combatancy to an 
Article III court.  This requirement might be fulfilled either by a 
preliminary or post-conviction de novo combatancy trial before an 
Article III tribunal.380  While the MCA permits limited review of 
commission proceedings before the D.C. Circuit, the Act expressly 
restricts such review to “matters of law.”381  Thus, the MCA professes to 
place responsibility for determining the prerequisite constitutionally 
necessary, jurisdictional facts exclusively in the hands of the 
commission.  Long ago, the Supreme Court recognized that when 
Congress seeks to invest non-Article III bodies with adjudicative power, 
Article III courts must make de novo judicial determinations of the 
prerequisite constitutionally necessary “jurisdictional” facts before a 
judgment may be enforced.382  While the Court has since abandoned the 
de novo review requirement in private civil disputes,383 this requirement 
 
 377.  Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9.   
 378.  Ex parte Quirin, 47 F. Supp. 431, 431 (D.D.C. 1942). 
 379.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 47 (1942) (emphasis added). 
 380.  Because “combatancy” is an element of the offense, the Government must prove it 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 381.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 950g(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2622 
(2006).   
 382.  Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54-56 (1932).   
 383.  St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 54 (1936).  The de novo review 
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remains an absolutely inviolate component of criminal law.384  In 
criminal cases, courts may not defer to an extra-Judicial body’s findings 
of constitutionally necessary facts.385  The MCA violates this principle 
by purporting to strip Article III courts of the ability to make these 
requisite factual determinations.386  Mere Article III appellate review is 
insufficient.  As the Court has explained, 
[o]ur precedents make it clear that the constitutional requirements for 
the exercise of the judicial power must be met at all stages of 
adjudication, and not only on appeal, where the court is restricted to 
considerations of law, as well as the nature of the case as it has been 
shaped at the trial level.387 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi lends support to this argument.  
Hamdi involved a habeas petition brought by a United States citizen 
captured in Afghanistan and held indefinitely without charge by the 
Executive as an enemy combatant.388  The divided Court issued a 
judgment requiring that in order to proceed with the indefinite detention 
of a citizen alleged to be an “unlawful combatant,” the Government must 
notify the detainee of “the factual basis of his classification” and provide 
him an opportunity “to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before 
 
requirement in civil cases fell casualty to the modern administrative state.   
 384.  See, e.g., Sash v. Zenk, 439 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that courts owe agencies 
no deference in matters of criminal law).  Territorial “legislative courts” fall outside this prohibition 
because they are derived from Congress’ plenary authority over federal territories and thus are 
analogous to state courts.  American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). 
 385.  Sash, 439 F.3d at 64.   
 386.  Historically such combatancy could be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.  For 
example, even in the absence of their judicial admission, the combatancy of the Quirin defendants 
could have been established by evidence demonstrating that they buried German uniforms and 
munitions upon landing in the United States.  See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942).  The 
Government’s task would be admittedly more difficult in the present conflict.  “In addition to 
belligerents captured during the heat of war in Afghanistan, the U.S. authorities are also detaining at 
Guantanamo Bay . . . numerous individuals who were captured hundreds or thousands of miles from 
a battle zone in the traditional sense of that term . . . . [D]etainees at Guantanamo Bay . . . include 
men who were taken into custody as far away from Afghanistan as Gambia, Zambia, Bosnia, and 
Thailand.”  In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446 (D.D.C. 2005).  But this is 
precisely why the Government should be put to its proof.  While military membership (including 
membership in an enemy’s military) subjects belligerents to military jurisdiction, the Constitution 
dictates that civilians not be put to the hardships attendant to military justice.  In re Yamashita, 327 
U.S. 1, 9 (1946). 
 387.  Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 n.39 (1982) 
(plurality opinion).   
 388.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11 (2004). 
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a neutral decisionmaker.”389  The Government’s factual assertions create 
a “presumption” in favor of its classification such that once it provides 
“credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-
combatant criteria,” the burden shifts to the petitioner “to rebut that 
evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the 
criteria.”390     
In dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that for American citizens, Quirin 
dictates that the conclusive Judicial determination of combatancy is an 
absolute prerequisite to the exercise of military jurisdiction.   
In Quirin it was uncontested that the petitioners were members of 
enemy forces.  They were “admitted enemy invaders,” and it was 
“undisputed” that they had landed in the United States in service of 
German forces.  The specific holding of the Court was only that, “upon 
the conceded facts,” the petitioners were “plainly within [the] 
boundaries” of military jurisdiction.  But where those jurisdictional 
facts are not conceded — where the petitioner insists that he is not a 
belligerent — Quirin left the pre-existing law [articulated by Milligan] 
in place . . . .391 
Justice Scalia qualified his proffered “conceded facts” rule, stating 
that it does not apply to the detention of aliens.  He based this limitation 
on his view that non-citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay lack access to 
habeas jurisdiction because they have not set foot on United States 
sovereign soil, and thus have not achieved constitutional privity under 
Eisentrager.392  Dissenting in Boumediene, he reiterated this argument.  
“There is simply no support for the Court’s assertion that constitutional 
rights extend to aliens held outside U.S. sovereign territory . . . , and 
Eisentrager could not be clearer that the privilege of habeas corpus does 
not extend to aliens abroad.”393  I agree with Justice Scalia’s limiting 
construction of Quirin, but the Boumediene majority opinion 
demonstrates why his “conceded facts” rule cannot be limited to 
citizens.  The trial and/or detention of accused aliens in United States 
territory provides the necessary constitutional nexus to bring into play 
constitutional rights that “are universal in their application to all persons 
 
 389.  Id. at 533. 
 390.  Id. at 534. 
 391.  Id. at 571-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).   
 392.  Id. at 577 (“Several limitations give my views in this matter a relatively narrow compass.  
They apply only to citizens, accused of being enemy combatants, who are detained within the 
territorial jurisdiction of a federal court.”). 
 393.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2302 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
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within the territorial jurisdiction . . . .”394  As explained above, the 
Government’s perpetual control over Guantanamo Bay fully renders the 
site the “de facto” territory of the United States.395   
The MCA does not limit military-commission jurisdiction to 
confirmed combatants.  The Act empowers the President to empanel 
military commissions to try “alien unlawful enemy combatants . . . for 
violations of the law of war . . . .”396  The Act broadly defines an 
“unlawful enemy combatant” to include,  
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and 
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person 
who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or 
 
(ii) a person who . . . has been determined to be an unlawful enemy 
combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another 
competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or 
the Secretary of Defense.397  
Neither of these requirements limits military jurisdiction to confirmed 
combatants.  
First, the statute’s reference to “a person who has engaged in 
hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities 
against the United States” simply describes the nature of the offense for 
which someone who satisfies the necessary jurisdictional requisites may 
be tried.  It provides no mechanism to determine a defendant’s 
combatant status. 
Second, the MCA’s reliance upon the determinations of Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) is similarly deficient.  Responding 
to Hamdi and Rasul, the Defense Department promulgated regulations 
creating CSRTs, limited-purpose military tribunals assigned to ascertain 
whether the Government possesses reasonable cause to indefinitely 
detain suspected enemy combatants.398  The Department modeled these 
procedures upon Justice O’Connor’s plurality decision in Hamdi.  
 
 394.  Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).   
 395.  See supra Part III.A.     
 396.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948b(a)-(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 
2602 (2006).  
 397.  Id. § 948a. 
 398.  Muneer I. Ahmad, Guantanamo Is Here: The Military Commissions Act and Noncitizen 
Vulnerability, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 11-12 (2007).   
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Congress subsequently codified the use of CSRTs in the Detainee 
Treatment Act.399   
CSRTs employ a rebuttable presumption of combatancy.400  Given 
the accused’s generally limited access to evidence, this presumption is a 
heavy one to overcome.401  Despite the Hamdi plurality’s apparent 
endorsement of the process, the Boumediene majority seemed to reverse 
course, labeling  CSRTs “closed and accusatorial,” noting that “even 
when all the parties involved in [the CSRT] process act with diligence 
and in good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s 
findings of fact.”402  As Judge Rogers noted in his dissent to the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Boumediene,403 in addition to shifting the burden of 
proof, the CSRTs impose other significant obstacles.   
The detainee need not be informed of the basis of his detention (which 
may be classified), need not be allowed to introduce rebuttal evidence 
(which is sometimes deemed by the CSRT too impractical to acquire), 
and must proceed without the benefit of his own counsel.  Moreover, 
these proceedings occur before a board of military judges subject to 
command influence . . . . Additionally, . . . continued detention may be 
justified by a CSRT on the basis of evidence resulting from torture.404    
Given the “considerable risk of error in [its] findings of fact,”405 the 
truncated preliminary procedure provided by CSRT review is a patently 
insufficient, constitutional substitute for determination of 
constitutionally necessary, jurisdictional facts by an Article III court. 
Justice Thomas’ dissent in Hamdan took the opposite position.  A 
CSRT had previously branded Hamdan an “enemy combatant.”406  
 
 399.  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 199 Stat. 2680, 2742 
(2005).   
 400.  Id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i). 
 401.  See Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terror, 109 
PENN ST. L. REV. 967, 1020-21 (2005) (“Under the combatant status review tribunal rules, a civil 
standard of proof is required as opposed to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This creates a danger 
that, in cases of uncertainty about whether the detainee is an enemy combatant, the doubts will be 
settled in the government’s favor. This is particularly true when the civil standard of proof is 
coupled with a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence. This effectively places the 
accused in a position of having to establish that he is not an enemy combatant.”). 
 402.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 403.  476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting).  A majority of the D.C. Circuit 
panel had denied the petitioner’s habeas petition finding that he lacked constitutional rights under 
Eisentrager because he had no “presence or property” in the United States.  Id. at 990-94. 
 404.  Id. at 1005-06 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 405.  Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270. 
 406.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570 (2006). 
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Joined by Justices Alito and Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that 
Hamdan’s allegedly established “enemy combatant” status subjected 
him to military jurisdiction.  This methodology rested on the apparent 
presumption of Hamdan’s guilt to justify subjecting him to the 
extraordinary jurisdiction of a military commission.  “Hamdan is an 
unlawful combatant charged with joining and conspiring with a terrorist 
network . . . .”407  This assertion puts the cart before the horse.  The 
dissenters explicitly accepted the CSRT’s preliminary administrative 
determination that Hamdan was guilty of being an unlawful combatant 
as sufficient to subject him to trial before a military commission on the 
charge of being an unlawful combatant.  As Quirin acknowledged, 
“[c]onstitutional safeguards for the protection of all who are charged 
with offenses are not to be disregarded in order to inflict merited 
punishment on some who are guilty.”408  In the Quirin and Yamashita 
law-of-war commissions, every defendant’s combatancy status was 
undisputed.409  As Justice Scalia’s own dissenting opinion in Hamdi 
persuasively demonstrates, the Quirin defendants’ concession of 
combatancy was necessary to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites to 
subject them to military, rather than civilian jurisdiction.  The issue at 
trial was simply whether they engaged in unlawful acts of belligerency.  
Conversely, Hamdan had not conceded membership in al Qaeda, or any 
other foreign corps hostile to the United States.   
The MCA’s classification of all “combatants” within its jurisdiction 
as “unlawful” also runs afoul of Milligan’s jurisdictional boundaries.410  
The Act limits the definition of “lawful” combatants, over which the 
 
 407.  Id. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).   
 408.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).  
 409.  General Yamashita (unlike the Quirin petitioners) was not accused of being an unlawful 
combatant.  Rather, he was accused of being a lawful combatant who engaged in unlawful 
belligerency.  As Professor Paust has explained:  
The phrase “unlawful combatant” . . . confuses two separate issues concerning (1) the 
status of a person (e.g., as a combatant or noncombatant who is not privileged to engage 
in combat), and (2) a lack of immunity for personal acts committed in violation of the 
laws of war.  If one is a combatant, one is not an unlawful combatant (although some of 
their acts may be unlawful), and a person having any status can violate the laws of war 
and lack immunity from prosecution.  
Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to al Qaeda, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 759, 768 n.43 (2007).  The 
MCA, however, eviscerates this distinction.  Under the Act, “lawful” combatants are textually 
limited to those who “abide by the law of war.”  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-366, § 948a(2), 120 Stat. 2600, 2601 (2006).  Because General Yamashita was convicted of 
violating the laws of war, he would have been an “unlawful combatant” under the MCA.  See id. 
 410.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948d(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2603 
(2006). 
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commissions lack jurisdiction, to “state affiliated” soldiers, excluding 
Taliban fighters.411  This limitation demonstrates a fundamental 
incompatibility with traditional models of law-of-war commission 
jurisdiction.  A central premise underlying law-of-war jurisdiction 
assumes that the defendant may raise the immunities of war as a 
defense — that the defendant’s conceded belligerency may be found to 
be “lawful.”  In all previously sanctioned law-of-war commissions, the 
tribunals were charged with determining whether the combatant had 
engaged in “lawful” or “unlawful” combatancy.  A combatant could not 
be punished for merely raising arms against the United States, only for 
committing war crimes.  For example, General Yamashita could not 
have been convicted for simply engaging in acts of hostility against 
American forces; only for engaging in acts of belligerency that violated 
the laws of war.412  The ability to raise these immunities mitigates the 
harshness of military justice.   
Milligan demonstrates that a law-of-war commission may not 
exercise jurisdiction in cases where any act of combatancy alone would 
be “unlawful.”  Such commissions are only appropriate where the 
accused can raise the defense that he acted as a “lawful” combatant.  
Milligan’s inability to raise any defense that he was a lawful combatant 
removed his case from the realm of military jurisdiction.   
If in Indiana [Milligan] conspired with bad men to assist the enemy, he 
is punishable for it in the courts of Indiana; but, when tried for the 
offense, he cannot plead the rights of war [as a lawful combatant]; for 
he was not engaged in legal acts of hostility against the government, 
and only such persons [combatants], when captured, are prisoners of 
war.  If he cannot enjoy the immunities attaching to the character of a 
[lawful combatant] prisoner of war, how can he be subject to their 
pains and penalties?413   
 
 411.  Id. § 948a(2).  The Taliban are presumably denied “lawful” combatant status because of 
their failure to wear uniforms.  See id. § 948a(2)(B) (limiting lawful combatant status to corps 
“wear[ing] a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance”). 
 412.  General Yamashita’s charge read:  
[W]hile commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United States of America 
and its allies, [Yamashita] unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as 
commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them 
to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United States and 
of its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he . . . thereby violated 
the laws of war.   
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1946).  
 413.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 82 (1866).   
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Here, the MCA provides no such safe harbor.  The overwhelming 
majority of Guantanamo Bay inmates are not members of state-affiliated 
military corps.  As with Milligan’s alleged membership in the “Sons of 
Liberty,” the immunities of war are wholly unavailable.    
To be clear, I am not arguing that the Government cannot render 
individuals who raise arms against the United States on behalf of al 
Qaeda or other foreign (or domestic) terrorist organizations as outlaws.  
As with RICO,414 Congress can provide that individuals who knowingly 
offer assistance to terrorist enterprises bear criminal responsibility for 
crimes committed by such enterprises.415  Terrorist organizations are not 
due the dignity — and corresponding immunities — afforded to state 
actors.  But as far as law-of-war-commission jurisdiction has been 
traditionally understood, combatancy is inherently a two-sided coin.  As 
Milligan demonstrates, if a defendant “cannot enjoy the immunities 
attaching to the character” of lawful combatancy, “how can he be subject 
to the pains and penalties” of military jurisdiction?   
2. For a Defendant to Be Subject to the Jurisdiction of a Law-of-
War Military Commission, He Must Be a Member of a State-
Affiliated Military Corps 
The MCA limits military-commission jurisdiction entirely to sub-
state actors.  This classification ignores a fundamental limitation upon 
military jurisdiction implicit in Milligan and Quirin.  In both cases, the 
defendants were accused of acting on behalf of organizations hostile to 
the United States.  In Quirin, the defendants were acknowledged 
members of the German military dispatched to commit acts of sabotage 
in the United States.  The Government accused Milligan of conspiring 
with the insurgent Sons of Liberty to commit similarly disruptive acts 
behind Union lines during the Civil War.  In both cases, the defendants 
were tried in locations where the civilian courts were open and available.  
The Court found the state-affiliated Quirin defendants amenable to law-
of-war jurisdiction while Milligan, a sub-state actor, retained the right to 
be tried by an Article III court subject to the Bill of Rights.  I suggest 
 
 414.  18 U.S.C.A §§ 1961-1968 (West 2006). 
 415.  Criminal liability should be limited to material support that the organization can use to 
further its terrorist goals.  Mere advocacy, expressions of agreement, or symbolic membership in an 
organization should not give rise to criminal liability.  See United States v. Marzook, 383 
F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that the Government cannot criminalize mere 
advocacy of a terrorist organization’s goals or symbolic membership therein).   
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that read together, Quirin and Milligan should be interpreted to limit 
law-of-war commission jurisdiction to members of state-affiliated 
military corps.   
State affiliation is a principled bright-line distinction between war 
crimes punishable by military tribunals and those subject to Article III 
jurisdiction.  As Quirin explained, Milligan’s alleged offenses, while 
criminally proscribed as violations of the “law of war,” nonetheless, fell 
into a “class of offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury.”416  In 
this vein, Quirin expressly distinguished Milligan, concluding that the 
petitioner in Milligan was not triable by a law-of-war commission 
because he was merely a member of a sub-state insurgent group and 
“not . . . a part of or associated with the armed forces of the 
enemy . . . .”417  The Court further emphasized state affiliation in its 
discussion of Petitioner Haupt’s American citizenship.  “Citizens who 
associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government . . . 
are enemy belligerents within the meaning of . . . the law of war.”418   
The state-actor dichotomy is a critical limiting principle.  If mere 
affiliation with sub-state actors dedicated to committing violence against 
military interests or even civilians gave rise to military jurisdiction, the 
role of the Judiciary would be greatly circumscribed.419  Consider some 
historical examples.   
In 1995, members of an insurgent militia group killed 168 people in 
the bombing of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City.420  Two 
perpetrators, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, were ultimately tried 
and convicted by civilian courts for their crimes.421  Yet, it was never 
suggested that their militia affiliation gave rise to military jurisdiction.  
The Ku Klux Klan — “[t]he world’s oldest, most persistent terrorist 
organization” — has engaged in a systematic campaign of violence and 
 
 416.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942).   
 417.  Id. at 45 (emphasis added).   
 418.  Id. at 37-38 (emphasis added).   
 419.  I do not mean to imply that Congress cannot impose special procedures for trials of 
suspected terrorists.  In light of the national-security implications and peculiar threats at issue in 
these cases, I believe that Congress could appropriately establish a special court, such as the FISA 
court.  But whatever procedures might be applied, the separation of powers dictates that an Article 
III setting is necessary.   
 420.  Tatsha Robertson, Militia Groups Say McVeigh Case Is Proof of U.S. Plot, BOSTON 
GLOBE, May 14, 2001, at A1.   
 421.  See United States v. McVeigh, 9 F. App’x 980 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nichols, 
No. 99-1438, 2000 WL 1846225 (10th Cir. 2000).   
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intimidation against civilians for more than 130 years.422  As Justice 
Thomas observed,  
Fifty years before the Irish Republican Army was organized, a century 
before Al Fatah declared its holy war on Israel, the Ku Klux Klan was 
actively harassing, torturing and murdering in the United States.  
Today . . . its members remain fanatically committed to a course of 
violent opposition to social progress and racial equality in the United 
States.423   
The Klan has “scourged, mangled, banished and murdered” untold 
thousands of victims.424  Nonetheless, it has never been subjected to 
military jurisdiction.425   
I do not mean to minimize the extraordinary threat posed by al 
Qaeda and similar organizations.  As Justice Thomas aptly noted, “[w]e 
are not engaged in a traditional battle with a nation-state, but with a 
worldwide, hydra-headed enemy, who lurks in the shadows conspiring 
to reproduce the atrocities of September 11, 2001 . . . .”426  Nonetheless, 
once divorced from the implicit limiting principle of state affiliation, the 
boundaries of military jurisdiction rest upon a very slippery slope.  So 
unmoored, the jurisdictional trap door opens to virtually any large 
organized and potentially dangerous band that can euphemistically be 
described as being “at war” with the Government.  As the Supreme 
Court noted, “the national security underpinnings of the ‘war on 
terror’ . . . are broad and malleable . . . .”427  So it is with many other 
“wars” waged in recent years.  What about the on-going “war on drugs?”  
The Government has engaged in military operations in Colombia.428  Are 
Colombian drug lords “enemy combatants?”  What about the Mexican 
drug lord tried in Verdugo-Urquidez?429   
 
 422.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 388-89 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 423.  Id. 
 424.  Susan H. Bitensky, Section 1983: Agent of Peace or Vehicle of Violence Against 
Children?, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 342 n.53 (2001) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 
518 (1871)). 
 425.  In 1871, Congress suspended the writ of habeas corpus in nine South Carolina counties 
to fight the Klan.  Michael W. Fitzgerald, Lou Faulkner Williams, The Great South Carolina Ku 
Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 193, 193 (1999).  
 426.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 705 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 427.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004). 
 428.  Miriam Schneider, Note, Military Spying in the United States: When It Is Not Your 
Neighbor Knocking at Your Door, Where Do You Turn?, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 199, 208 
n.52 (2005).   
 429.  494 U.S. 259 (1990).  See supra notes 153-169 and accompanying text. 
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Dissenting in Hamdan, Justice Thomas argued that state affiliation 
is not a requisite element of military jurisdiction.  As he quite correctly 
observed, quoting Colonel Winthrop, precedent supports the argument 
that military tribunals “have jurisdiction over ‘[i]rregular armed bodies 
or persons not forming part of the organized forces of a belligerent’ 
‘who would not be likely to respect the laws of war.’”430  But Justice 
Thomas’ opinion confuses territory-based commissions, chartered in 
locales where ongoing fighting prevents the civil courts from 
functioning, with the “law of war” commissions contemplated by the 
MCA.  As Winthrop recognized, law-of-war commissions enjoy much 
more circumscribed jurisdiction.  The jurisdiction of such commissions 
is limited to “[i]ndividuals of the enemy’s army who have been guilty 
of . . . offences in violation of the laws of war . . . .”431   
Territory-based military commissions operate in lieu of civilian 
courts in locations where civil authorities cannot function.  As such, they 
possess jurisdiction over the panoply of defendants, including 
civilians.432  Conversely, as Quirin recognized, the jurisdiction of law-
of-war commissions is limited to defendants “associate[d] . . . with the 
military arm of the enemy government . . . .”433  If the expansive 
jurisdiction to which Justice Thomas refers (i.e., “[i]rregular armed 
bodies or persons”) extended to law-of-war commissions, Milligan 
necessarily would have been subject to military jurisdiction.  Recall that 
the Government plainly charged Milligan with offenses “recognized by 
our courts as violat[ive] of the law of war . . . .”434  If sub-state militants 
fall within the jurisdiction of such commissions, Milligan’s association 
with the “Sons of Liberty” seemingly would have brought him too 
within that jurisdiction.  It might be tempting to argue that the present 
threat posed by al Qaeda is more serious than that presented by the pro-
Confederate insurgents in Milligan.  But viewed in proper historical 
context, this contention plainly fails.  During the Civil War the Midwest 
was plagued by several militant secret societies plotting to sabotage the 
 
 430.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 688 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 192, 
at 783, 784). 
 431.  WINTHROP, supra note 192, at 838 (emphasis added).   
 432.  Id. at 836.   
 433.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942) (emphasis added).   
 434.  Milligan faced charges of “conspiring” with the insurgent Sons of Liberty “to overthrow 
the Government, seize munitions, and liberate [Confederate] prisoners of war.”  Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 567 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  It is well settled that “furnishing [the 
enemy] with . . . arms” and “aiding the escape of [enemy] soldiers held as prisoners of war” are 
paradigmatic violations of the laws and usages of war.  WINTHROP, supra note 192, at 840. 
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Union war effort.  Chief among these were the Sons of Liberty.435  
Moreover, the Court decided Milligan in the immediate aftermath of a 
war fought on American soil that cost some 600,000 lives,436 and just 
months after other insurgents successfully conspired to assassinate 
President Lincoln.  Yet, the Court found that even these dire 
circumstances did not militate against the dictates of the separation of 
powers.   
Were law-of-war commission jurisdiction as malleable as Justice 
Thomas suggests, innumerable “enemies” could be subjected to military 
trials by the simple Executive dispatch of armed forces coupled with the 
talismanic cry of “war.”  As Milligan illustrates, the separation of 
powers cannot be evaded so easily — at least not when the defendants 
are tried in territory within the “de facto” and “practical sovereignty” of 
the United States.437 
3. By Quirin’s Own Terms, a Formal Declaration of War Is a 
Necessary Condition Precedent to the Congressional 
Establishment of Law-of-War Military Commissions 
No constitutional provision confers upon Congress or the President 
the power to empanel extra-Judicial military commissions.  Rather, 
Quirin deduced that this power emanates from the combined force of the 
enumerated war-related powers, which read together, “invest[] the 
President, as Commander in Chief, with the power to wage war which 
Congress has declared . . . .”438  Because, by Quirin’s own terms, a 
formal declaration of war is a necessary condition precedent to the 
commission power, that power cannot be exercised in the absence of 
such a declaration.   
 
 
 435.  Capt. Robert G. Bracknell, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime, 47 NAVAL 
L. REV. 208, 216 (2000) (book review) (citing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 83-84 (1998)).   
 436.  Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s Perspective, 40 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 11, 13 (2003).  The exact number of Civil War casualties is subject to dispute.  Sources 
estimate the number of dead as low as 500,000 and as high as 700,000.  Michael P. O’Connor, Time 
Out of Mind: Our Collective Amnesia about the History of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 93 
KENTUCKY L.J. 659, 682 n.121 (2005).   
 437.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2252-53 (2008). 
 438.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added).   
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a. No Constitutional Provision Confers the Power to Convene 
Law-of-War Military Commissions 
 
“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its 
power and authority have no other source.  It can only act in accordance 
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.”439  As such, the 
power to empanel military commissions must itself derive from the 
Constitution.  Pressed to identify the constitutional locus of this power, 
Quirin referred to the so-called “war power.”  Of course, there is no 
express “war power” provision in the Constitution, much less a “military 
commissions” clause.  Rather, as Quirin noted, the Constitution confers 
Congress with several enumerated war-related powers:  
(1) To provide for the common Defence; 
(2) To raise and support Armies; 
(3) To provide and maintain a Navy; 
(4) To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces; 
(5) To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; 
(6) To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations; 
(7) To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.440 
In light of the canon that “provisions of the Constitution,” that are 
“specific” in “grant or restriction” supersede “general clauses, which 
afford a broad outline,”441 none of these powers taken alone authorizes 
the establishment of military commissions.  As Milligan noted, “[t]he 
provisions of” the Constitution “on the administration of criminal justice 
 
 439.  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (plurality opinion).  
 440.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26.   
 441.  Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).  See also New York 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (“[T]he Solicitor 
General argues . . . that the general powers of the Government adopted in the original Constitution 
should be interpreted to limit and restrict the specific and emphatic guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
adopted later.  I can imagine no greater perversion of history.”).   
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are . . . plain and direct.”442  Thus, the specificity canon dictates that 
constitutional authorization to deviate from these procedures — to 
conduct criminal adjudications outside the auspices of the Judicial 
Branch — must be equally “plain and direct.”   
None of the enumerated war-related powers referenced above 
conveys the authority to convene law-of-war commissions.  Quirin did 
not find otherwise.  In a feat of jurisprudential legerdemain, the Court 
concluded that these powers combine to yield a sum greater than its 
parts.  Putting aside the logical deficiencies of this line of reasoning, 
Quirin concluded that the extra-textual commission power is a necessary 
implication of the fact that “[t]he Constitution . . . invests the President, 
as Commander in Chief, with the power to wage war which Congress 
has declared . . . .”443  I save for another day the debate over Quirin’s 
ontological argument.444  For present purposes it is sufficient to note that 
by the terms of the Court’s own reasoning, a congressional declaration 
of war is a necessary condition precedent to Quirin’s commission power.   
 
(1) The Powers “To provide for the common 
Defence”; “To raise and support Armies”; 
and “To provide and maintain a Navy” 
 
The first three of the clauses addressed by Quirin — empowering 
Congress to “provide for the common Defence,” “raise and support 
Armies,” and “provide and maintain a Navy” — merely convey generic 
authority to establish and subsidize a federal military.  They invest 
Congress with the “indefinite power of raising troops, as well as 
providing fleets; and of maintaining both in peace, as well as in 
war . . . .”445  But these clauses offer no textual authority to empanel 
extra-Judicial criminal adjudicatory forums.   
 
 
 442.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 75 (1866).   
 443.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added).   
 444.  The Ontological argument posits that if one can conceive of God, God must exist.  Steven 
D. Smith, Natural Law and Contemporary Moral Thought: A Guide from the Perplexed, 42 AM. J. 
JURIS. 299, 313 n.55 (1997).   
 445.  FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 270 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).   
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(2) The Power “To make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces” 
 
The Supreme Court has long construed Congress’ power to “make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” 
as authority for the exercise of courts-martial jurisdiction over American 
servicemen.446  Some suggest that the provision likewise authorizes the 
exercise of military jurisdiction over enemy combatants.447  But this 
construction finds no support in either the text or the history of the 
clause.  Its plain language suggests that the clause’s contemplation of 
“the land and naval forces” directly refers to the very American armies 
and navies which the preceding provisions empower Congress to 
“establish,” “raise and support.”  The clause’s history confirms this.  The 
Framers simply “added [it] from the existing Articles of 
Confederation.”448  The provision from which the clause was borrowed 
made clear that it contemplated only regulation of Armed Forces “in the 
service of the United States.”449   
The United States in Congress assembled shall . . . have the sole and 
exclusive right and power of . . . appointing all officers of the Land 
Forces, in the service of the United States . . . — Appointing all the 
officers of the Naval Forces, and commissioning all officers whatever 
in the service of the United States — Making Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the Said Land and Naval Forces, and 
directing their operations.450   
While the clause, as incorporated into Article I, section 8, omitted 
the words “in the service of the United States,” the complete absence of 
 
 446.  Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 78-79 (1857).  Other decisions suggest that 
courts-martial jurisdiction arises from the conjunction of this provision and the Fifth Amendment’s 
exemption to the Grand Jury indictment requirement for “cases arising in the land or naval forces.”  
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 77.   
 447.  Cf. Josiah Ramsey Fricton, Note, The Balance of Power: The Supreme Court’s Decision 
on Military Commissions and the Competing Interests in the War on Terror, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1693, 1701 (2007) (“Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to 
regulate military commissions by giving Congress the power ‘to make rules for the government and 
regulation of the land and naval forces,’ which means that the President must have authorization 
from Congress to enact military commissions.”).   
 448.  JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 482 
(Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (“‘To make rules for the Government and regulation of 
the land & naval forces,’ added from the existing Articles of Confederation.”).   
 449.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 4 (1777) (emphasis added).   
 450.  Id. (emphasis added).   
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debate demonstrates that the change was purely stylistic and did not 
evidence any intent to change its meaning from that in the Articles of 
Confederation.   
Moreover, even if this omission could be construed to extend 
regulatory power over the troops of a foreign state, it could not authorize 
the trial of private parties not associated with any nation’s “land [or] 
naval Forces.”  Milligan’s finding that the defendant’s alleged affiliation 
with an insurgent militia group did not bring him within the ambit of 
military jurisdiction illustrates this principle.451   
 
(3) The Powers to “grant Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal,” and to “make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water” 
 
The exercise of military jurisdiction similarly cannot be attributed 
to the power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” or to “make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”  Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal constitute “an authorization . . . granted in time of war by a 
government to the owner of a private vessel to capture enemy vessels 
and goods on the high seas.”452  This provision merely empowers 
Congress to authorize “the seizure or destruction of property of another 
nation to atone for an international wrong committed by that nation.”453  
As Blackstone explained, “the words” Marque and Reprisal “in 
themselves . . . signify[] a taking in return . . . .”454  The power to “make 
Rules concerning Captures on land and Water” likewise “authorize[s] 
the seizure and condemnation of the property of the enemy within or 
 
 451.  See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 78.  Even with respect to individuals associated with American 
military forces, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed the ambit of courts-martial jurisdiction.  
The Court has struck down extensions of courts-martial jurisdiction to the trial of civilian 
dependents accompanying American servicemen abroad, Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 
361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960), civilian employees attached to U.S. military installations overseas, 
Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 279-80 (1960), and even former servicemen accused of crimes 
committed during their term of service, United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14-15 
(1955). 
 452.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 814 (5th ed. 1979). 
 453.  Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1559 (2002) 
(emphasis added) (citing EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 283-86 (Joseph Chitty ed., 
1863) (1758)); see also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 126 (1814); JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 94 (5th ed., Melville M. Bigelow 
ed., 1994). 
 454.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *258 (emphasis added), quoted in Ramsey, 
supra note 453, at 1599. 
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without the United States.”455  The clause’s predecessor in the Articles 
of Confederation specifies that it empowers Congress to “establish[] 
rules for deciding . . . in what manner prizes taken by land or naval 
forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or 
appropriated.”456  No historical account suggests the Framers construed 
these provisions to apply to the prosecution — much less the extra-
Judicial prosecution — of enemy troops.   
 
(4) The Power to “define and punish Piracies 
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, 
and Offences against the Law of Nations” 
 
Proponents of military jurisdiction sometimes cite the power to 
“define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, 
and Offences against the Law of Nations” as authority to empanel 
military commissions.457  But this provision too is a nonstarter.  The 
Framers contemplated a limited realm of exclusive federal criminal 
jurisdiction.458  Believing that in these limited areas “[t]he law should be 
uniform,” the Framers collectively empowered Congress to “punish 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; counterfeiting the 
securities and current coin of the U[nited] States, and offences a[gainst] 
the laws of nations.”459   
 
 455.  STORY, supra note 453, at 95 (emphasis added). 
 456.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 1 (1777). 
 457.  See Capt. Brian C. Baldrate, The Supreme Court’s Role in Defining the Jurisdiction of 
Military Tribunals: A Study, Critique, and Proposal for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 186 MIL. L. REV. 1, 
11 (2005) (“By giving Congress the power to ‘declare War’ and ‘to define and punish Piracies and 
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations,’ the 
Constitution . . . empowers Congress to create military commissions to prosecute war crimes and to 
establish martial law and military government courts.”).   
 458.  See, e.g., Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Changing Face of White-Collar Crime: The Federal 
Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 643, 651 (2006) (“the Constitution contemplates a limited role for federal criminal 
law”); Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
45, 51 (1998) (“The Framers of the Constitution contemplated a relatively minor role for the federal 
government in responding to criminal activities.”); Alan L. Adlestein, A Corporation’s Right to a 
Jury Trial Under the Sixth Amendment, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 392 n.79 (1994) (“the federal 
government’s criminal jurisdiction was clearly not contemplated to replace the basic police power 
of the states”). 
 459.  MADISON, supra note 448, at 474.  This provision was later divided into separate clauses.  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
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A subsequent revision empowered Congress to “define and to 
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”460  The Framers added 
the term “define” at the behest of Gouverneur Morris to underscore the 
need for enabling legislation, because “the law of nations,” in his view, 
was “too vague and deficient to be a rule.”461  Thus, the clause merely 
authorizes Congress to enact federal criminal statutes defining and 
prescribing punishment for “Piracy” and “Offences against the law of 
nations,” and divests the States of criminal jurisdiction over these 
matters.  But as with other sources of exclusive federal criminal 
authority, it merely empowers Congress to define offenses that may be 
prosecuted by the Executive and tried by the Judiciary.462  As Justice 
Wilson463 noted in Henfield’s Case464 in 1793, as “congress has power to 
‘define and punish offences against the law of nations,’ the jurisdiction 
of the states is thereby divested of the particular subject matter; and that 
consequently as the jurisdiction exists somewhere, it exists in the federal 
courts . . . .”465  The clause no more empowers Congress to create an 
extra-Judicial forum to adjudicate violations of the laws it enacts under it 
than does Congress’ power to “[p]unish[] . . . counterfeiting.”466   
 
 
 460.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 614-15 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(emphasis added). 
 461.  Id. at 615. 
 462.  As the Court has explained,  
The Constitution divides the National Government into three branches — Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial.  This “separation of powers” was obviously not instituted with 
the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency.  It was, on the contrary, looked 
to as a bulwark against tyranny.  For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a given 
policy can be implemented only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial 
application, and executive implementation, no man or group of men will be able to 
impose its unchecked will. 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-43 (1965). 
 463.  Justice Wilson was an influential delegate at the Constitutional Convention.  William R. 
Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of 
Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 505 n.210 (1986). 
 464.  11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360). 
 465.  Id. at 1120 n.6 (emphasis added).  This is also evidenced by the fact that prosecution of 
piracy, criminalized under this clause, has been conducted in Article III courts.  E.g., United States 
v. Pirates, 18 U.S. 184 (1820); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820). 
 466.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. 
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(5) The Power “To make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers” 
 
In light of the “plain and direct” provisions concerning adjudication 
of criminal charges,467 the Supreme Court has found that “the Necessary 
and Proper Clause cannot operate to extend military jurisdiction to any 
group of persons beyond that class described in Clause 14 — ‘the land 
and naval Forces.’”468  Because Clause 14 — the power “[t]o make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” 
— is limited in reach to Forces “in the service of the United States,”469 
Congress likewise could not enact the MCA on the basis of the 
“Necessary and Proper” Clause.   
 
b. Because the Power to Convene Law-of-War Commissions 
Principally Emanates from Congress’ Power to Declare 
War, a Declaration of War Is a Necessary Condition 
Precedent to the Establishment of Such Commissions 
 
In apparent recognition of the fact that none of the above-
referenced powers authorize extra-Judicial criminal adjudicatory forums, 
Quirin held that when synergized and read in concert with the 
President’s authority as Commander in Chief, these powers collectively 
yield the authority to convene military commissions:   
The Constitution . . . invests the President, as Commander in Chief, 
with the power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry 
into effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for 
the government and regulation of the Armed Forces, and all laws 
defining and punishing offenses against the law of nations, including 
those which pertain to the conduct of war.470  
This rationale is strangely reminiscent of Justice Douglas’ 
controversial thesis in Griswold v. Connecticut471 that the “specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
 
 467.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 75 (1866). 
 468.  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1957) (plurality opinion).   
 469.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 4 (1777) (emphasis added); see also Milligan, 
71 U.S. at 123.  See supra Part VII.B.3.a.2. 
 470.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942).  
 471.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
81
DeVeaux: Rationalizing the Constitution
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
07-DEVEAUX-2 1/27/2009  1:04 PM 
94 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:13 
 
from those guarantees . . . .”472  Among these “penumbras,” Douglas 
opined, is a constitutionally mandated “right of privacy.”473  Quirin 
reasoned, in effect, that the enumerated war powers set out in Article I 
and the President’s Article II commander-in-chief power too have 
“penumbras.”  Just as Griswold found that the Bill of Rights collectively 
imparts a right of privacy despite the fact that no single Amendment 
creates such a right, Quirin found that the enumerated war-related 
powers and the commander-in-chief power collectively impart the extra-
textual power to empanel law-of-war commissions despite the fact that 
none of these provisions create such a power.   
Quirin’s analysis presupposes a declaration of war.  The Court did 
not hold that the commission power is triggered by the simple 
congressional authorization of force.  Rather, the Court found that it 
arises as a natural consequence of the fact that “[t]he Constitution . . . 
invests the President, as Commander in Chief, with the power to wage 
war which Congress has declared . . . .”474  While the other war-related 
powers also play a role, Quirin’s emphasis on the simultaneous exercise 
of the declare-war and commander-in-chief powers demonstrates that 
these authorities form the wellspring from which the commission power 
originates.  Justice Douglas’ “privacy” syllogism, while relying on 
multiple Bill of Rights provisions, similarly emphasized the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments as principle sources, describing them “as protection 
against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and 
the privacies of life.’”475  Just as Griswold’s “privacy” narrative could 
not stand on the force of the remaining Bill-of-Rights Amendments 
alone, Quirin’s commission power presupposes a congressional 
declaration of war. 
Given that none of the enumerated war powers even remotely 
contemplate the establishment of military commissions, I question 
Quirin’s deduction that the combination of these provisions implies 
congressional power to establish tribunals so plainly prohibited by 
Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  In light of these 
deficiencies, the commission power should not be further expanded 
beyond the already textually questionable limits recognized by Quirin.   
 
 472.  Id. at 484. 
 473.  Id. at 485. 
 474.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added). 
 475.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).   
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The distinction between “declared” and “undeclared” wars has no 
significance under international law.476  Nonetheless, the notion that a 
formal declaration of war triggers domestic-law powers unavailable 
during undeclared wars has long been recognized by both the Court and 
Congress.  In 1800, the Supreme Court distinguished declared “general” 
wars and undeclared “limited” wars.  As Justice Chase recognized in Bas 
v. Tingy,477  
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or congress may 
wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects and in time.  If a 
general war is declared, its extent and operations are only restricted 
and regulated by the [laws of war] . . . ; but if a partial war is waged, 
its extent and operation depend on our municipal laws. . . . [T]here 
are, undoubtedly, many rights attached to a [declared] general war, 
which do not attach to [an undeclared limited war’s] modification of 
the powers of defence and aggression.478   
Bas did not expressly address the constitutional limitations upon 
Congress’ war power.  The Court found that congressional authorization 
of a “limited” war, without more, does not invoke the full panoply of 
sovereign war powers recognized under the law of war.479  Unlike the 
authorization in Bas, the MCA did not merely sanction the use of 
military force; it expressly authorized law-of-war commissions.  
Nonetheless, Bas recognized that a declaration of war is not merely a 
symbolic exercise, but rather triggers normative separation-of-powers 
consequences not implicated by a mere authorization to use military 
force.480  Congress has likewise recognized this distinction.  To date, 
Presidents have committed American troops to at least 125 military 
engagements.481  Congress sanctioned many of these campaigns through 
 
 476.  “A declaration of war serves no purpose under international law; it can have no bearing 
on the underlying legal situation.  No longer a performative utterance, it is only a meaningless 
utterance — not even descriptive — from the perspective of international law.”  Paul W. Kahn, War 
Powers and the Millennium, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 11, 16-17 (2000) (citing Stephen C. Neff, 
Towards a Law of Unarmed Conflict: A Proposal for A New International Law of Hostility, 28 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 14-15 (1995)).   
 477.  4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
 478.  Id. at 43-44  (Chase, J.) (emphasis added).   
 479.  Id. 
 480.  Because Bas focused on congressional authorization, presumably the President could not 
have ordered Naval officers or privateers to act in a manner inconsistent with Congress’ directive, 
even if such authority would be available under the law of nations had Congress declared war.    
 481.  Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 30 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring).   
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simple legislation.482  But it has formally declared war only five times.483  
At the same time, Congress has continuously recognized that a 
declaration of war is an act of great constitutional significance.  As 
Judge Randolph noted in Campbell v. Clinton:484  
A congressional declaration of war carries with it profound 
consequences.  The United States Code is thick with laws expanding 
executive power “in time of war” . . . . Under these laws, the 
President’s authority over industries, the use of land, and the terms and 
conditions of military employment is greatly enhanced.  A declaration 
of war may also have the effect of decreasing commercial choices and 
curtailing civil liberties.485   
These powers are not available during an undeclared war — whether the 
hostilities are congressionally authorized or not.486   
At the height of the Vietnam War, the Court of Military Appeals 
held in United States v. Averette487 that a provision of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice authorizing courts-martial of Defense Department 
civilian employees “in time of war” applied only during the pendency of 
a congressionally declared war.488  While the court premised its ruling 
on statutory construction, it made clear that its reading was strongly 
influenced by constitutional considerations: “[G]uidance . . . from the 
Supreme Court” concerning “the constitutionally delicate question of 
military jurisdiction over civilians” dictates “that a strict and literal 
construction of the phrase ‘in time of war’ should be applied.”489  “A 
broader construction . . . would open the possibility of civilian 
prosecutions by military courts whenever military action on a varying 
 
 482.  REHNQUIST, supra note 435, at 218.  A spirited debate rages whether Congress possesses 
the textual authority to authorize the use of military force absent a declaration of war.  This issue 
need not be debated here.  If Congress lacks the lesser power to authorize undeclared wars, which is 
uncontradicted by any express congressional prohibitions, it necessarily lacks the greater power to 
empanel law-of-war commissions — a power which is at odds with the express prohibitions of 
Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.   
 483.  Campbell, 203 F.3d at 30 n.6 (Randolph, J., concurring).   
 484.  203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).   
 485.  Id. at 29-30 (Randolph, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing OFFICE OF THE JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL, U.S. AIR FORCE, DIGEST OF WAR AND EMERGENCY LEGISLATION 
AFFECTING THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE 171-84, 185-91, 192-98 (1996) (contrasting statutes “effective 
in time of war,” “effective in time of national emergency declared by the President,” and “effective 
in time of national emergency declared by Congress”)).   
 486.  Id.   
 487.  19 C.M.A. 363 (1970). 
 488.  Id. at 365. 
 489.  Id. 
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scale of intensity occurs.”490  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
emphasized that Vietnam constituted a “war” in both the colloquial and 
the international-law sense, but not in the constitutional sense.   
We emphasize our awareness that the fighting in Vietnam qualifies as 
a war as that word is generally used and understood.  By almost any 
standard of comparison — the number of persons involved, the level of 
casualties, the ferocity of the combat, the extent of the suffering, and 
the impact on our nation — the Vietnamese armed conflict is a major 
military action.  But such a recognition should not serve as a shortcut 
for a formal declaration of war, at least in the sensitive area of 
subjecting civilians to military jurisdiction.491  
While Campbell and Averette involved questions of statutory 
construction, both these judgments invoked the canon of constitutional 
avoidance.492  The canon “is a tool for choosing between competing 
plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable 
presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises 
serious constitutional doubts.”493  The courts implicitly recognized that 
the invocation of certain powers during the pendency of an undeclared 
war raised more “serious constitutional doubts” than would be posed by 
the invocation of those same powers during the prosecution of a declared 
war.  Chief Justice Rehnquist echoed these sentiments, arguing that a 
declaration of war does in fact trigger otherwise unavailable 
constitutional powers.  Contrasting the twentieth century’s undeclared 
wars with the two World Wars and the Civil War (which he regarded as 
the “equivalent of a declared war”),494 the Chief Justice concluded that 
 
 490.  Id. 
 491.  Id. at 365-66 (emphasis added). 
 492.  Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring) 
(holding that a Congress member lacked standing to challenge President Clinton’s violation of the 
War-Powers Act because plaintiff could not show that the President’s action “had the effect of 
completely nullifying their votes” not to declare war because a “congressional declaration of war 
carries with it profound consequences” not implicated by the mere authorization of force); Averette, 
19 C.M.A. at 365 (adopting a “a strict and literal construction of the phrase ‘in time of war’” 
because of “recent guidance . . . from the Supreme court” concerning “the constitutionally delicate 
question of military jurisdiction over civilians”).   
 493.  Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).   
 494.  REHNQUIST, supra note 435, at 218, cited in Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1406 (1999) (“Rehnquist is quite clear about his reasons for limiting his 
analysis to the Civil War, World War I, and World War II: those were the nation’s declared wars (or 
their equivalent, in the case of the Civil War).”).  The Chief Justice implied that infringement of 
civil liberties was constitutionally limited to wars where the nation’s very survival was at stake.  See 
REHNQUIST, supra note 435, at 223.  Formal declarations of war apparently provide a necessary 
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“[w]ithout question the government’s authority to engage in conduct 
that infringes civil liberty is greatest in time of declared war — the 
Schenck and Hirabayashi opinions make this clear.”495   
The textual basis for the Chief Justice’s argument is wanting.  But it 
is no more tenuous than the Court’s penumbra-like reading of the war-
related powers.  And it is consistent with a straightforward reading of 
Quirin: the power to convene law-of-war commissions is incident to the 
“power to wage war which Congress has declared . . . .”496  This reading 
can also be reconciled with Milligan.  Because of its dubious textual 
basis, however, I would oppose the extension of Quirin’s penumbra-like 
rationale to justify the invocation of other extra-textual powers in the 
event a war is declared in the future.  I argue that Quirin should be 
limited to its facts.  As Milligan emphasized, the Judiciary’s recurrent 
struggle “to preserve liberty and to relieve those in civil life from 
military trials”497 informs the Constitution’s separation-of-powers 
design.  Given this presumption against military jurisdiction, in the 
absence of a formal declaration of war — “the highest sovereign 
prerogative”498 — neither Congress, nor the President may convene 
Quirin-type law-of-war commissions within de facto American territory 
so long as the civil courts are functioning.499  Congress has made no 
such declaration — in Afghanistan or elsewhere.   
One might argue that the Authorization for Use of Military Force500 
(“AUMF”), enacted by Congress in the aftermath of the September 11, 
2001 attacks constitutes a viable substitute for a formal declaration of 
war.501  The AUMF authorized the President to “use all necessary and 
appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” which he 
determined “planned, authorized, committed, or aided in the September 
 
litmus test for such a state of affairs.  See id. (pondering whether a President should “risk[] losing 
the Union that gave life to the Constitution because that charter denied him the necessary authority 
to preserve the Union”).     
 495.  REHNQUIST, supra note 435, at 218 (emphasis added).  Chief Justice Rehnquist cited two 
decisions in support of this proposition: Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirming the 
conviction of a World War I draft protester under a statute criminalizing interference with 
conscription) and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (affirming conviction of 
knowingly disregarding a curfew order imposed on persons of Japanese ancestry). 
 496.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) (emphasis added). 
 497.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 75 (1866). 
 498.  STORY, supra note 453, at 92.   
 499.  The Hamdan plurality acknowledged that law-of-war commissions were not utilized in 
either Korea or Vietnam.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 617 (2006). 
 500.  Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  
 501.  One could make the same argument about the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution or Congress’ 
authorization to use force preceding the first Gulf War. 
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11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorist attacks.”502  This generalized consent 
broadly authorizes the President to use military force.  But this very 
breadth shows why it is inadequate.  Constitutionally contemplated 
declarations of war are directed toward specific States.  They are not 
generically directed to “enemies” to be identified later by the 
President.503  The power to declare war does not constitute a blank 
check.  “[T]he power of declaring war is . . . in its own nature and 
effects, so critical and calamitous that it requires the utmost deliberation, 
and the successive review of all the councils of the nations.”504  It is 
precisely the task of declaring war against a particularly identified 
enemy at a particular time that separates formal declarations of war 
from the more rhetorical declarations (such as the “war on drugs”) 
discussed in the preceding section.  The AUMF is, at most, a “limited” 
authorization of “the powers of defence and aggression,”505 not a 
constitutional declaration of war triggering the synergized war powers 
contemplated by Quirin.   
Some say that this is simply empty formalism,506 that Congress 
could easily nullify the argument by replacing the AUMF with a 
 
 502.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
 503.  See John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) 
Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 904 (1990) (noting that 
“declarations of war don’t typically specify allies; they specify enemies”).  In a similar vein, 
Professor Ely argued that a congressional authorization of force that “failed to specify an enemy . . . 
seems a textbook violation of the nondelegation doctrine. . . .”  Id. at 895-96. 
 504.  STORY, supra note 453, at 92. 
 505.  Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43-44 (1800) (Chase, J.).  
 506.  See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, The U.S. Right to Use Force in Response to the Attacks on 
the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 865, 867 (2004) 
(“Today, formal declarations of war are as much an anachronism as ‘Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal’ — another power given to Congress in the same clause that has been outlawed by 
international law.”).  This position is inconsistent with the Framers’ design.  Experienced as they 
were with the ruthless efficiency of the British “regulars,” the founding generation was deeply 
fearful of standing armies in general and the President’s seemingly unilateral control of them in 
particular.  See Earl F. Martin, America’s Anti-Standing Army Tradition and the Separate 
Community Doctrine, 76 MISS. L.J. 135, 180 (2006) (discussing the founding generations’ fear of 
standing armies).  Addressing these fears, Alexander Hamilton argued that the Constitution’s 
division of war-making responsibilities precluded the Executive’s unilateral invocation of the 
panoply of law-of-war powers so frequently abused by English monarchs.  Hamilton placed 
particular emphasis on Congress’ exclusive power to declare war.   
[T]he President is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States.  
In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great-
Britain, but in substance much inferior to it.  It would amount to nothing more than the 
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and 
admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war 
and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies — all which, by the Constitution 
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declaration of war.  But the simple fact is that it has not declared war 
since 1941 — despite the fact that the United States has engaged in at 
least five undeclared wars during that period.  A declaration of war 
carries greater political consequences than a generic authorization of 
force.  The Framers sought to hold Congress’ feet to this political fire 
before empowering it to restrict otherwise inviolate civil liberties such as 
through the invocation of the extra-textual commission power identified 
in Quirin.507  As the Supreme Court noted in New York v. United 
States,508 
Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form of 
our government, and the courts have traditionally invalidated measures 
deviating from that form.  The result may appear “formalistic” in a 
given case to partisans of the measure at issue, because such measures 
are typically the product of the era’s perceived necessity.  But the 
Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides 
power . . . precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate 
power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the 
day.509   
Given the Court’s inflexible adherence to the Framers’ “finely 
wrought and exhaustively considered procedure[s],”510 in past 
 
under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. 
FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis added).  
Hamilton’s essay demonstrates that the Framers did not consider the declaration of war to be merely 
symbolic.   
 507.  This “bright-line test” forces “Congress to take a clear stand, up front, on questions of 
war and peace.”  Ely, supra note 503, at 924.  As Professor Gregory Sidak observed, 
[A]dherence to formalism in matters that affect the separation of powers, including the 
initiation of war, is more likely than constitutional informality and political 
improvisation to produce predictability and clarity in the specification of the 
responsibilities of political officials in Congress and the executive branch; to facilitate 
the effective monitoring of these political officials as they discharge their 
responsibilities; and to permit the electoral process to function as an effective means to 
reward fidelity, good judgment, and the resourcefulness, and likewise to punish 
infidelity, folly, and indolence.   
J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 68 (1992). 
 508.  505 U.S. 144 (1992).   
 509.  Id. at 187.  Strict adherence to formalism is evident in Boumediene.  There, Congress 
could have replaced the MCA’s revocation of habeas jurisdiction with a formal suspension of the 
writ for Guantanamo detainees.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  This did not prevent the Court from 
requiring Congress to observe this formality.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2260-61 
(2008).   
 510.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (holding that 
one house veto violated the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements).  See also 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that line-item veto violated the 
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separation-of-powers decisions, strict adherence to form seems 
particularly compelling before enabling Congress and the President to 
invoke the amorphous “war power” to trump the “plain and direct” 
prohibitions of Article III and the Bill of Rights.511   
CONCLUSION 
Milligan advocated a bright-line rule that admitted no exceptions. 
Prior to the advent of World War II, even the most fervent advocates of 
military jurisdiction acknowledged that the Constitution required that a 
“[military commission] trial must be had within the theatre of war . . . ; 
that, if held elsewhere, and where the civil courts are open and available, 
the proceedings and sentence will be coram non judice.”512  Nonetheless, 
confronted with apparent threats of Executive non-compliance, the 
Quirin Court seemingly emasculated this rule.  Whether the Justices did 
so out of a sense of felt need, or in response to Executive extortion, the 
new rule they announced is discordant with the text, history, and policy 
of the Constitution.  They may well have believed or hoped that the 
decision would simply become lost amongst the dust of the United 
States Reports.  It did not.  As Justice Jackson warned, “rationaliz[ing] 
the Constitution” to judicially bless the usurpation of a constitutional 
power has lasting consequences: once judicially recognized, “[t]he 
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any 
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”513  
I leave for another day the question of whether Quirin should be 
overruled.  But it should not be expanded. 
During times of war or insurrection, the military may be called 
upon to exercise the powers of government temporarily in places where 
fighting prevents the operation of civil authority.  The President, as 
commander in chief, is necessarily called upon to assume the mantle of 
government for the affected territory, usually through his military 
 
Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements); Sidak, supra note 507, at 71 
(“Consider the alternative: If no particular formalism need be obeyed by Congress when the United 
States decides to initiate war against another nation . . . then it is doubtful that any constitutional 
event could command obedience to form.  In such a case, the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
legislative veto in Chadha on the grounds that it violated bicameralism and presentment would be 
simply pedantic.”).   
 511.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 66, 73 (1866). 
 512.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 598 n.29 (2006) (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 
192, at 836). 
 513.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).   
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proxies.  In these limited circumstances, the Constitution permits the 
President to exercise the panoply of government functions — executive, 
legislative, and judicial.  But this power must be regarded as the ultimate 
necessary evil that should be strictly limited to the time and place of the 
violence.  Entrusting the trinity of powers in a single hand, even with the 
blessing of Congress, is the very anathema of the constitutional design.  
By empowering the military, and thus ultimately the President, to try 
sub-state actors before inquisitorial criminal tribunals that are wholly 
removed from the physical boundaries of the war zone and the temporal 
constraints of a formal declaration of war, the MCA commits this 
cardinal sin.  There can be no more fundamental constitutional truth: the 
power to conduct criminal trials is quintessentially Judicial.514  Congress 
cannot divest this responsibility, nor may the courts abdicate it.515   
As with Milligan and Korematsu, the Supreme Court may well be 
called upon once again to determine the legitimacy of the MCA.516  Read 
together, Milligan and Quirin provide the tools necessary to impose 
limiting principles cabining military jurisdiction within traditionally 
recognized constitutional bounds.   
Once unmoored from these limiting principles, the Constitution’s 
promise of an independent Judiciary rings hollow.  This is particularly 
true when applied to the present, ill-defined conflict.  “[T]he national 
security underpinnings of the ‘war on terror’ . . . are broad and 
malleable.”517  If such a generalized declaration of hostilities against 
unspecified enemies can oust the Judiciary of its primary constitutional 
function, then the most fundamental liberty-preserving device of the 
Constitution will be emasculated.  For only “if governmental power is 
fractionalized, if a given policy can be implemented only by a 
combination of legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive 
implementation, no man or group of men will be able to impose its 
 
 514.  United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955); Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121.   
 515.  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 79 (“[The Framers] secured the inheritance they had fought to 
maintain, by incorporating in a written constitution the safeguards which time had proved were 
essential to its preservation.  Not one of these safeguards can the President, or Congress, or the 
Judiciary disturb, except the one concerning the writ of habeas corpus.”).   
 516.  Even if the next President elects to discontinue the use of military commissions, the 
MCA’s constitutionality still may come before the Court.  The propriety of any MCA conviction or 
sentence issued before the discontinuation of military-commission prosecutions will rest upon the 
MCA’s constitutionality.  Moreover, barring congressional action, the MCA will remain on the 
books to be utilized by future presidents.   
 517.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004). 
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unchecked will.”518  The Court should not allow the President to open 
this Pandora’s Box, even with Congress’ consent.  “[T]he political 
branches [do not] have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at 
will . . . .”519   
As the events of September 11, 2001 demonstrate, the 
Government’s interest in prosecuting suspected terrorists detained at 
Guantanamo is undoubtedly compelling.  A great many of these men — 
perhaps even most — are guilty of unspeakable crimes.  But just as 
certainly, we must face the inconvenient reality that some of them are 
innocent.  How we identify the guilty is a judgment that, like Korematsu, 
may define the legacy of the Court and the American legal community 
for generations to come.  
 
 518.  United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) (emphasis added). 
 519.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008). 
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